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ARTICLES
COMPENSATION’S ROLE IN DETERRENCE
Russell M. Gold*

ABSTRACT
There are plenty of noneconomic reasons to care whether victims are compensated in class
actions. The traditional law-and-economics view, however, is that when individual claim values
are small, there is no reason to care whether victims are compensated. Rather than compensation
deterring wrongdoing is tort law’s primary economic objective. And on this score, law-and-economics scholars contend that only the aggregate amount of money that a defendant expects to pay
affects deterrence. They say that it does not matter for deterrence purposes how that money is split
between victims, lawyers, and charities. This Article challenges that claim about achieving tort
law’s primary objective and argues that there is an economic reason to care whether victims are
compensated in class actions. It offers reason to think that compensating victims deters more
wrongdoing than the same amount of relief in other forms, at least in damages class actions.
Put a different way, this Article contends that the primary objectives of class actions—
compensation and deterrence—are intertwined in ways that scholars have not previously recognized. Compensation affects the amount of reputational harm that class actions inflict on
defendants, and anticipating that reputational harm provides a source of deterrence. Because
the public cares whether victims are compensated in civil litigation, if class actions were fre© 2016 Russell M. Gold. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
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quently to slight compensation that would undermine public perception of the class device; class
actions would come to seem more like plaintiffs’ lawyers’ extortion mechanisms than legitimate
means of redressing harm. Diminished procedural legitimacy makes the class action a less powerful signal about the validity of the underlying claims, which undermines reputational deterrence.

INTRODUCTION
In 2014 Pepsi settled a labeling class action regarding Naked Juice for $9
million.1 Of that $9 million settlement fund, $5.5 million was allocated to
compensate customers.2 A few years ago Facebook settled a privacy class
action for $9.5 million;3 in contrast to the Naked Juice settlement, none of
the money went to victims.4 It went instead to charity and class counsel as
attorneys’ fees.5
There are, of course, noneconomic reasons to care whether victims are
compensated in class actions: class counsel’s professional responsibility or
agency obligations to the class,6 philosophical commitments to compensating
victims,7 or the Rules Enabling Act.8 From an economic perspective, however, scholars have argued that for purposes of tort law’s primary objective—
deterring wrongdoing9—it does not matter whether victims are compensated
in class actions.10 Rather, they argue, only the aggregate amount and likeli1 Civil Minutes at 4, Pappas v. Naked Juice Co. of Glendora, Inc., No. CV11-08276 JAK
(PLAx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014).
2 See id.
3 Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2012).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669, 680 (1986) (“[I]n economic terms, there are high ‘agency costs’ associated
with class and derivative actions.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law
of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 354 (identifying “the incentives for faithful representation by class counsel” as “the real source of legitimacy in class actions”).
7 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 326 (1992) (articulating a correctivejustice account of tort law that requires wrongdoers who cause harms to others to bear the
cost of the loss imposed).
8 See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 75–82 (arguing that
bounty hunter class actions violate the Rules Enabling Act by transforming the compensatory norm of the substantive law).
9 David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1874, 1890–91 (2002) (identifying deterrence as
tort law’s primary objective).
10 See id. at 1893 (“[A]ll that matters for optimal deterrence is that the judgment or
settlement accounts for the total aggregate tortious harm, not how or whether it distributes
damages among claimants.” (emphasis added)); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action
Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2060 (2010) (“[A] purely deterrencebased theory of civil litigation might be indifferent between defendants paying those they
have injured and defendants paying completely unrelated third parties.”). Descriptively,
John Coffee has recognized that courts are more willing to impose high penalties when
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hood of payment matter when considering the settlement’s deterrent
effect.11 Whether class actions typically follow the Naked Juice approach of
giving much of the judgment to victims or the Facebook approach of giving
nothing to victims—the thinking goes—does not affect deterrence.12 This
Article challenges that notion.
Instead, it offers reason to think that compensation affects deterrence in
ways that scholars have not recognized. A class action judgment will likely do
more harm to a defendant’s reputation if class action damages13 are typically
paid primarily to victims than if they are typically paid primarily to attorneys
or charities.14 Although class action judgments in practice typically compensate victims, some cases have recently pushed the boundaries of using cy pres
awards for charity or attorneys’ fees instead of compensating victims,15 and
the Supreme Court seems poised to consider the proper role for such compensation-less class settlements.16 Although the primary goal of this Article is
to refine the scholarly understanding of deterrence in damages class actions
and recognize that compensation plays a role in deterrence, developing the
theoretical underpinnings for how compensation-less settlements affect tort
law’s primary economic objective is particularly important in light of likely
Supreme Court review.
Avoiding reputational harm constitutes a largely unrecognized form of
deterrence. Most scholars have focused on damages as though it were the
sole source of deterrence in litigation.17 A few scholars, however, have recognized that nonlegal harms—including harms that litigation inflicts on
victims are compensated. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 434–35 &
n.133 (1981).
11 See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 1893.
12 See id.
13 This Article addresses damages class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) and not traditional civil rights cases or individual tort litigation. The same dynamics may play out in at
least some individual tort litigation, but that claim is beyond the scope of this Article.
14 Victim compensation here is contrasted with attorneys’ fees and cy pres awards to
charity that do not compensate victims directly. Damages that escheat to the state or other
regulatory fines may be closer to compensation than to cy pres awards for reputational
purposes, but those types of relief are not addressed here.
15 See, e.g., In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 715 (6th Cir. 2013) (reversing
approval of settlement that awarded $2.73 million to class counsel and “nothing but nearly
worthless injunctive relief” to absent class members); Lane v. Facebook Inc., 696 F.3d 811,
817 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (affirming approval of settlement that
awarded nothing to absent class members but $6.5 million to a new charity, one of whose
directors is a Facebook executive).
16 Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (explaining that the Court should soon take up “more fundamental concerns” with cy
pres awards in class actions).
17 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 473 (2004);
David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 853 (2002).
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defendants’ reputations—deter wrongdoing.18 The literature on reputational deterrence in class actions has been particularly thin. Only one
scholar has noted, in passing, this idea that reputational harm may deter
wrongdoing.19
Class actions provide reputational deterrence so long as the filing or settlement of a class action is seen to signal wrongdoing. Because class action
settlement agreements explicitly deny wrongdoing, reputational harm and
the extent to which potential defendants can anticipate such harm depend in
part on whether the class device is viewed as a meaningful signal of wrongdoing despite that denial. Drawing on corporate crime and derivative suit literature, this Article contends that whether a class action is seen to signal to the
casual observer that the underlying claims have merit turns on the procedural legitimacy of the class device.20 That’s where compensation comes in.
Whether victims are typically compensated in class actions affects the
procedural legitimacy of the class device because the American public values
compensation and expects civil litigation to compensate victims, including
class actions.21 Scholars agree as a descriptive matter that the public desires
victim compensation in civil litigation.22 This compensationalist sentiment
that ties compensation to procedural legitimacy can be seen from several different perspectives. First, it can be seen through elected officials. Congress
relied on compensationalist rhetoric to advance several pieces of legislation
affecting class actions: the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),23 the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),24 the FAIR Funds
Act,25 and the FTC Improvement Act.26 Using compensationalist rhetoric
suggests that members of Congress thought the compensationalist message
would resonate with their voters. Moreover, for those wary of concluding
that congressional rhetoric means anything, there is evidence from the judi18 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from
Damages?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 401 (2001); Paul H. Rubin et al., BMW v Gore: Mitigating
the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 179, 186 (1997).
19 See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2222 (2010) (mentioning reputational harm as a potential source of deterrence in the securities context); cf. Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass Claims Resolution Without Class Actions, 63 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1272, 1280 (2014)
(recognizing reputational concerns in class actions, though not as a source of deterrence).
20 See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 511 (2006); Lawton W. Hawkins, Exchange-Enhanced Special Litigation Committees: Enforcing Fiduciary Duties amid a Crisis of Trust, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 587, 602; infra Part IV.
21 See infra Part III.
22 See id.
23 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
25 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012)).
26 Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 206(a)(b), 88 Stat. 2183, 2201–02 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b(b)); see infra Section III.A.
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cial branch about compensationalist public sentiment and its relationship to
the legitimacy of the class device. Two prominent judges relied on the need
to preserve public legitimacy in aggregate litigation as reason to modify private attorneys’ fee arrangements.27 Similarly, a Judicial Conference Report
expressed concern that affording too little compensation for victims risked
jeopardizing the legitimacy of the class device.28 Lastly, polling data confirms this compensationalist sentiment.29
If class actions are typically seen as shakedowns by plaintiffs’ lawyers trying to make a buck, class action filing or settlement will send a different
message than if class actions are seen as compensatory. If victims are typically
compensated, class actions will tend to be seen as fulfilling the public’s
expectation of civil litigation—providing a means to redress widespread
harm to actual victims.30 The perception that some have been wronged necessarily carries with it the perception of wrongdoing and a wrongdoer—likely
the defendant.
The intertwinement of compensation and deterrence means that compensation is not merely a “[f]alse [i]dol”31 or relevant only to those who
approach tort law and complex litigation from a noneconomic perspective.
Rather, compensation matters for economic reasons, including in smallclaim class actions. In small-claim cases, several scholars have recently advocated focusing only on the aggregate judgment without considering how
much of the money goes to victims because—they contend—how much
money goes to victims does not matter for deterrence.32 Brian Fitzpatrick
argues that compensation impedes deterrence, and he thus advocates eliminating compensation entirely and awarding class counsel all of the recovery
in small-claim cases—what he calls a 100% attorneys’ fee.33
But recognizing the complex relationship between compensation and
deterrence means that it is not clear whether increasing fees as a portion of
the class’s recovery, and thus reducing compensation across class actions,
27 See Transcript of Status Conference at 54–56, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site
Litig., No. 1:21-mc-00100-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2010), ECF No. 2037; In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493–94 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); infra Section III.B.
28 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPoli
cies/rules/Reports/ST9-2002.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
29 See infra Section III.B.
30 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (recognizing that
where individual damages are small the class action may be necessary to make compensating victims feasible); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (same).
31 Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 131 (2006).
32 See id. at 105–06 (arguing that courts and policymakers should ignore victim compensation when individual claim values are small); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at
2044.
33 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2069–70.
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would actually increase deterrence.34 Increasing fees would generate more
litigation and thus presumably more damages deterrence. Yet decreasing victim compensation would tend to reduce reputational deterrence. Whether
these two effects would sum to increase or decrease deterrence is unclear,
but that ambiguity means that compensating victims is economically important in ways that scholars have not yet recognized, even when claim values are
small.35 And it means that broad-brush efforts to achieve optimal deterrence
trans-substantively across all class actions are unlikely to succeed.36 This
uncertainty compounds the challenges that scholars have already recognized
as inherent in optimizing deterrence through private enforcement.37
Trying to optimize deterrence with a scalpel in individual cases offers
more promise than adjusting fees across all class actions.38 Embracing a
broader role for public enforcement would allow the government to more
carefully manipulate the expected costs to defendants in each case.
Although public enforcement faces significant resource constraints, a
gatekeeping scheme much like the qui tam procedure could allow the government to cut off liability to prevent overdeterrence or add its imprimatur
to increase reputational harm on a case-by-case basis without bearing the full
costs of public enforcement.39 Another possibility would be to rely on judges
to set damages in individual cases such that each defendant’s total cost from
a class action (in reputation and damages) equals the amount of the harm it
imposed on others.40 The latter approach requires judges not only to estimate the amount of anticipated reputational harm but also to account for
the degree of victim compensation in class actions in so doing.
Although optimizing deterrence might seem best achieved by reducing
difficult-to-calibrate reputational deterrence and focusing on damages deterrence, reputational harm from class actions can be socially desirable.41
Reputational harm may be more efficient than damages sanctions reached
through settlement negotiations with significant information asymmetries
and may better reflect harms to non-parties.
Aside from optimal deterrence, reputational harm from settlement
helps preserve class actions’ informational function.42 Reducing reputational harm would make quick settlement cheaper for defendants than it is
now; the reputational costs of settlement would decrease while the potential
34 See infra Section V.A.
35 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2044; Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 105–06.
36 See infra Section V.A.
37 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577 (1997).
38 See infra Section V.A.
39 See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L. J.
616 (2013) (creating a taxonomy of various ways in which the government can act as “gatekeeper” to gain benefits of enforcement discretion without bearing all of the costs of
purely public enforcement); infra subsection V.A.1.
40 See infra subsection V.A.2.
41 See infra Section V.B.
42 See id.
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harm from bad documents emerging in discovery or at trial would remain
unchanged. Encouraging quick settlement can be socially harmful, however,
because “[l]itigation is when the facts come out.”43 The firestorm over General Motors’ ignition switches was triggered by an investigation into a wrongful death claim.44 Merrill Lynch’s CEO acknowledged in a deposition that
black brokers may have had a harder time at the company than white brokers.45 A Wal-Mart employee signed a declaration alleging that she attended
a business meeting at a Hooters restaurant, and another declared that she
felt compelled to visit an adult dance club on a business trip.46 These widely
reported facts surfaced only through litigation, and reputational harm from
settlement increases defendants’ incentive to litigate despite informational
risk.
Thus, there is reason to think that compensation creates more reputational deterrence than other forms of relief, at least in damages class actions.
Even in small-claim class actions where compensation is not a relevant economic end in itself, compensation remains important as a means to the
deterrence end. And more broadly, the primary objectives of tort law and
class actions—deterrence and compensation—are intertwined in ways that
scholars have not recognized.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explains traditional notions of
deterrence and compensation in litigation. Part II considers the nature of
reputational harm in class actions and its role in optimizing deterrence. Part
III discusses compensationalist public sentiment. Part IV explains why compensationalist sentiment means that compensation affects deterrence in class
actions. Lastly, Part V explores some of the implications of compensation’s
reputational effect on deterrence.
I. DETERRENCE

AND

COMPENSATION

Economic tort theorists identify optimal deterrence as the primary aim
of tort law.47 Some scholars such as David Rosenberg identify optimal insurance as the secondary aim.48 Let us consider those in turn, focusing on
deterrence.
43 Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 510 (2009).
44 Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055,
1067–68 (2015); Bill Vlasic, An Engineer’s Eureka Moment with a G.M. Flaw, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/business/a-florida-engineer-unlockedthe-mystery-of-gms-ignition-flaw.html?_r=0.
45 Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch in Big Payout for Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K
(Aug. 27, 2013, 9:02 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/merrill-lynch-in-bigpayout-for-bias-case.
46 Ellen Hawkes, What Wal-Mart Women Want, MS. MAG. (Sept. 2003), http://
www.msmagazine.com/sept03/walmart.asp.
47 Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 843.
48 Id.; id. at 846 (explaining superiority of optimal deterrence to optimal insurance).
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Litigation seeks to generate optimal deterrence by forcing firms to bear
the full social costs of their decisions.49 Under conditions of optimal deterrence, firms will choose their level of output and safety precautions based on
the net social costs of those choices rather than solely their net private
costs.50 Optimal deterrence is achieved when firms’ expected private costs
(including damages paid in litigation) equal the net social costs of their contemplated behavior—“no more, no less.”51
Assuming enforcement of every violation for the sake of explanation,
optimal deterrence would require setting damages equal to the harm
imposed on others.52 Suspending that full-enforcement assumption, optimal
damages must account for the chance that defendants will not be forced to
pay anything in litigation.53 Mathematically, optimal deterrence then
requires setting the sanction equal to the harm imposed on others multiplied
by the inverse of the probability that it will be imposed.54 To take an example, “if the harm is 100 and the probability of sanctions is 50 percent, the
sanction should be multiplied by 1/.5 = 2, so the sanction should equal 200
(and thus the expected sanction would equal 100).”55
Optimal deterrence is not maximal deterrence.56 Optimal deterrence
does not seek to induce firms to take all possible precautions to reduce the
49 Id. at 843. This Article seeks to refine deterrence theory in class actions and thus
does not enter the empirical debate regarding effectiveness of optimally deterrent damages. See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, A View from Within the Fortune 500: An Empirical
Study of Negative Value Class Actions and Deterrence, 47 IND. L. REV. 739, 744–45 (2014) (concluding that deterrence in corporations is not as powerful as theory suggests); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV.
63, 92 (2008) (“Empirical analysis cannot, for example, quantify the amount of fraudulent
conduct deterred by litigation, nor can it measure litigation’s benefits.”) .
50 See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 843 (2011); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 881–82 (1998); Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 843.
51 Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1322 (2008);
accord Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 843 (“Optimal tort deterrence threatens firms with
liability for the total costs of their tortious conduct.”).
52 SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 482–83.
53 Rose, supra note 51, at 1322 & n.98 (quoting SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 483); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 784 (2011); Coffee, supra note 10, at 389.
54 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 50, at 874; see also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 363 (1984) [hereinafter Shavell, Liability
for Harm] (“[T]he chance that parties would not face the threat of suit for harm done . . .
results in a dilution of the incentives to reduce risk created by liability . . . .” (emphasis
omitted)).
55 SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 483.
56 William T. Allen, Commentary on the Limits of Compensation and Deterrence in Legal Remedies, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 69–70; Rose, supra note 51, at 1331; see
also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 15 (1975) (describing the “overenforcement theorem” and explaining that overenforcement emerges when sanctions are set above the social costs of the illegal activity
because that sanction then triggers greater private enforcement); Polinsky & Shavell, supra
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risk of harm to others or cease activity that will or might cause some harm.57
Although it might seem that more deterrence of illegal conduct is always
better, overdeterrence “may result in wasteful precautions and the withdrawal of socially valuable products and services from the marketplace.”58
Taking these one at a time, deterrence theory does not seek to induce
“socially excessive precautions”—those “that cost[ ] more than the reduction
of harm produced by [them].”59 In addition to socially excessive precautions, overdeterrence may cause a firm “to withdraw its product from the
marketplace even though consumers place a higher value on the product
than its full cost of production, which includes the average harm caused by
the product.”60 In fact, optimal enforcement includes some underdeterrence to offset enforcement costs.61
A word about terminology is necessary here. Scholars often use “compensation” to discuss the non-instrumental virtue of civil litigation redressing
victims’ harm.62 “Compensation” is not typically thought to be an economic
concern in and of itself.63 Rather, Rosenberg and others posit that compensation is relevant only as a means to provide “insurance.”64 This Article uses
“compensation” to refer to paying victims to redress harm, regardless of the
underlying normative theory that justifies the payment, whether economic or
moral.
Scholars have recognized a connection between deterrence and compensation.65 When defendants pay money judgments to their victims, that
note 50, at 890 (“It is important to stress that the level of damages given by the formula is
optimal not only because this level remedies problems of underdeterrence, but also
because it avoids problems of overdeterrence.”).
57 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 50, at 900.
58 Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 53, at 244 (“It is just as important, however, from an
economic perspective, to avoid overcompensation as undercompensation. Overcompensation can increase the number of accidents by making potential victims careless, and can
make medical care more expensive . . . .”); Allen, supra note 56, at 85 (“[P]olitically or
socially, we tend to be concerned about deterrence, not over-deterrence. But our welfare
as a people requires us to be concerned about opportunity losses that enforcement of legal
rules can impose.”).
59 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 50, at 879; see also Rosenberg, supra note 17, at
831–32 (explaining that excessive precaution would harm overall social welfare by exceeding the point at which the sum of accident costs is minimized).
60 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 50, at 882.
61 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 54 n.29, 70 (2000).
62 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2060; John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory,
91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521–37 (2003).
63 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2060.
64 Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 1881–82; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2060–61.
Typically, maximizing social welfare under Rosenberg’s model requires not only optimal
deterrence but also optimal insurance. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 843, 845. Some risk
of harm will remain even if deterrence were optimized, and that residual risk might induce
individuals to behave inefficiently if they could not count on litigation (or some other form
of insurance) to cover their losses. See id. at 845.
65 Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 1892.
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they pay money deters wrongdoing. But Rosenberg argues that whether the
money goes to victims is irrelevant to deterrence.66 Rather, compensating
victims matters only for insurance purposes.67
In small-claim class actions, Fitzpatrick persuasively argues that there is
no need for insurance because individual claim values are small and individuals are not risk-averse regarding small losses.68 Because of the lack of risk
aversion, individuals will not alter their behavior ex ante to account for the
risk of loss.69 Thus, he argues, there is no benefit to compensating victims.
Fitzpatrick’s focus on deterrence in small-claim class actions puts him in
good company.70 Two other scholars have recently argued that courts and
scholars should pay no mind to compensation when claim values are small.71
They argue that several prominent scholars’ concerns about agency costs and
misalignment of class counsel and the class’s interests are largely wrongheaded72 because those concerns rely on the premise that it matters whether
class members are compensated.73 From a purely economic perspective, Fitzpatrick and others are right that deterrence is indeed the sole virtue of class
66 Id. at 1893 (“[A]ll that matters for optimal deterrence is that the judgment or settlement accounts for the total aggregate tortious harm, not how or whether it distributes damages
among claimants.” (emphasis added)).
67 Id.
68 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2066–67.
69 Id.; see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 135–36 (arguing that victims would
not alter their ex ante conduct based on the availability of compensation through smallclaim class actions and that compensation is therefore not economically necessary).
70 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 53, at 785 (“[W]hat is most important from an economic standpoint is that the violator be confronted with the costs of his violation—this
preserves the deterrent effect of litigation—not that he pay them to his victims.”); Gilles &
Friedman, supra note 31, at 105 (“All that matters [in small-claim class actions] is whether
the practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions.”);
id. at 106 (“[C]lass member compensation is irrelevant.”); William B. Rubenstein, Why
Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 709, 720–25 (2006) (arguing that small-claim class actions are socially justified
because of the positive externalities they generate, including deterrence); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 924 (1998)
(contending that deterrence is the most important goal of small-claim class actions and is
“perhaps [the] entire[ ]” purpose of such cases); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2519 (2008) (“Optimally deterring wrongdoing through litigation is one example of a public good.”).
71 Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 131–39. Although Gilles and Friedman address
the noneconomic concept of compensation, their sole focus on deterrence necessarily
implies that the economic concept of insurance—like compensation—is irrelevant.
72 Coffee, supra note 6, at 680 (“[I]n economic terms, there are high ‘agency costs’
associated with class and derivative actions.”); Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 366 (“The key
issue is the guarantee that the agent be the faithful guardian of the interests of the class.”);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 167, 197 (2009) (“The request for an award of fees and expenses places class
counsel in a direct conflict with the interests of the class.”).
73 Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 115–21; see also id. at 104 (labeling agency cost
problem “a mirage”).
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actions when all claim values are low.74 But this Article contends that compensation is nonetheless economically relevant because it bears on
deterrence.
In sum, optimal deterrence requires setting defendants’ expected private costs (including litigation judgments) equal to their social costs. Moreover, Rosenberg and Fitzpatrick contend that compensating victims is no
different for deterrence purposes than requiring the defendant to pay the
same aggregate amount to anyone else except insofar as paying victims
instead of attorneys reduces the incentive to litigate.
II. REPUTATIONAL HARM

AND

OPTIMAL DETERRENCE

Although the general construct of optimal tort deterrence requires setting potential defendants’ total expected costs equal to the net social harm
from their conduct,75 most tort theorists treat the expected unfavorable
court judgment as though it were the only way in which litigation increases
defendants’ expected costs. For instance, Steven Shavell, in Foundations of
Economic Analysis of Law, begins his discussion of sanctions and optimal deterrence by focusing only on deterrence from “monetary sanctions by the
state.”76 He addresses non-monetary sanctions only to the extent that they
are deliberately imposed.77 Similarly, A. Mitchell Polinsky’s and Shavell’s
classic analysis of punitive damages contends that “damages”—rather than
total costs to the defendant of litigation—should be “equal to the harm the
defendant has caused.”78 Rosenberg too seems to focus solely on monetary
damages as a source of deterrence.79
Some scholars, however, have recognized that litigation can and frequently does inflict nonlegal harms on defendants such as harm to their reputations.80 In the securities context, Amanda Rose explains that private
74 This is not to suggest that the class-client’s particular interests and the agency cost
problem are irrelevant, but rather that they are not economically important and thus fall
outside the frame of this Article.
75 Rose, supra note 51, at 1322; Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 843; supra Part I.
76 SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 473.
77 Id. at 492–514.
78 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 50, at 878.
79 Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 853 (“Optimal deterrence is achieved by threatening
the defendant with damages equal to the aggregate tortious loss.” (emphasis added)).
80 See, e.g., Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 401 (“[T]he total sanction suffered by the
wrongdoer equals the nonlegal sanction plus damages.”); Rubin et al., supra note 18, at
186 (“We will not re-examine that theory here except to note that for nonintentional torts,
market forces (including reputational losses), regulation and compensation for financial losses
through the tort system provide sufficient deterrence (and possibly over-deterrence in
many situations).” (emphasis added)); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1815, 1824 (2001) (explaining that the most prominent instances
of corporate shaming come about through court decisions, and the fear of shaming affects
whether a company will risk wrongdoing in the first instance).
There are other non-damages sources of deterrence such as defendants anticipating
having to pay their attorneys’ fees to defend a case and the notion that firms faced with
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securities enforcement may deter corporate officer wrongdoing in part by
threatening to inflict reputational damage.81 Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat
analyze the role of nonlegal sanctions such as reputational harm in optimizing deterrence, though they do not discuss the class action or settlement contexts.82 Recognizing reputational harm in class actions is important to
optimal deterrence because these harms will be non-negligible in many
instances83 and are particularly acute in the class action context where the
nature of the alleged harm is necessarily widespread.84
Scholars who ignore the import of reputational harm for optimizing
deterrence may assume that reputational harm creates a deadweight loss for
defendants that defendants will already internalize.85 Under that premise,
reputational harm would indeed be irrelevant to optimizing deterrence. But
suits will have their employees tied up dealing with lawyers instead of advancing the business. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1369 (1998); see also Deborah A. Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the
Closet: Avoiding Employment Class Actions, 26 EMP. REL. L.J., Autumn 2000, at 5, 20–21. This
Article focuses on reputational harm rather than these other sources of non-damages
deterrence.
81 Rose, supra note 19, at 2222. Although Richard Bierschbach and Alex Stein focus
largely on criminal enforcement, they recognize the existence of what they term “market
spillover[s],” meaning reputational or other harms to the defendant caused by something
other than the legal sanction itself such as consumers or shareholders modifying their
behavior to avoid involvement with a settling defendant. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex
Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1748 (2005); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 269–70 (1987) (assuming away for purposes of an example the
existence of reputational concerns); Buell, supra note 20, at 508 (“[T]he argument that law
does not matter to reputational effects [on entity criminal defendants] should be
approached skeptically.”); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 61, at 73 (“[O]thers may impose
on the violator external, extra-legal social sanctions (gossip, ostracism) . . . .”).
82 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18. Rose writes about designing an ideal securities
enforcement regime to achieve optimal deterrence but mentions deterrence from reputational harm only in passing. Rose, supra note 19, at 2222.
83 See Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 420 (noting that accounting for reputational
harm would “significantly reduce damages” in many cases).
84 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that a class be sufficiently numerous that
joinder of members individually is impracticable); see also Allen, supra note 56, at 67 (“Regularly, if not daily, print and broadcast journalists report violations of legal norms by business corporations that affect thousands of persons.”).
85 See Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2351–52
(2010) (noting that law-and-economics scholarship on optimal deterrence typically
assumes implicitly that reputational harms effectuate a deadweight loss). But cf. Cindy R.
Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 489, 489 (1999) (“To obtain a total sanction equal to the optimal sanction, following
theory developed by Gary S. Becker and others, requires coordination of [formal civil or
criminal sanctions with reputational penalties] to avoid over- or underdeterrence of
crime.” (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968))); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 584 (2008) (“[I]t is a mistake to consider only prospective legal penalties in . . . setting public policy because most of the financial penalty for
cooking the books comes from lost reputation.”).
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reputational harm is typically not a deadweight loss.86 Rather, reputational
harm to defendants creates positive value for others by deterring wrongdoers
and informing potential victims so that they can avoid a loss.87 Accordingly,
calculating ideal damages to achieve optimal deterrence in tort class actions
requires courts accounting for these benefits from reputational harm.88
Section A considers the nature of reputational harm in class actions,
while Section B expands on the discussion in the previous paragraph about
why reputational harm cannot simply be ignored when optimizing
deterrence.
A.

Nature of Reputational Harm in Class Actions

Criminal law literature illuminates the nature of reputational harm to
corporate defendants and their employees. Although criminal charging and
conviction is not perfectly analogous to class actions that are typically
resolved via settlement,89 reputational harm occurs at various stages of a class
action, albeit frequently to a lesser extent than in criminal law.90 That the
discrimination suits against Denny’s and Texaco were civil rather than criminal seems unlikely to have done much to lessen their devastating reputational
effect.91 Texaco’s market capitalization “plunged” by a billion dollars as allegations of its misconduct surfaced even though the case was a class action
resolved by settlement.92 Similarly, legal liabilities from the Firestone tire
cases “pale in comparison to the costs of the relentless—and relentlessly
86 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 405–10; see also infra Section II.B.
87 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 405–06; see also infra Section II.B.
88 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 402–03, 415–17; see also infra Section II.B.
89 Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3165, 3173 (2013) (describing settlement as “the overwhelming form of resolution of
any case in which a class is certified”). Regarding the broader potential concern that the
civil and criminal systems are simply too different to warrant meaningful comparison, see
David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil
Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683 (2005) (calling for
more comparative work between civil and criminal procedure while explaining their core
similarities) and Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 6-23) (on file with author) (explaining reasons for comparing plaintiffs’
counsel in damages class actions to criminal prosecutors).
90 See Buell, supra note 20, at 507 (arguing that criminal blame creates the strongest
form of institutional blame); see also Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Civil Liability, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 87, 88 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (explaining
that a civil sanction that is less serious than a criminal sanction is the appropriate structure
for creating ideal incentives). Buell explains that SEC enforcement actions “[u]ndeniably”
“have some stigmatic impact” and that the lack of admission required by defendants is
similar in SEC enforcement actions as in private lawsuit settlements. Id. at 93. The level of
stigma may be influenced by the SEC’s presence in the case. See id.
91 Skeel, supra note 80, at 1831 & n.75; see also Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the
Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 108–09 (2000) (describing Texaco as a “casualty”
and as suffering “devastating losses” as a result of a race discrimination class action).
92 Ramirez, supra note 91, at 108.
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scathing—media coverage” of the litigation.93 “Class actions can become a
public relations nightmare, especially when a large, well-known corporation
is the defendant.”94
Consider first the nature of reputational harms to corporations and their
employees from legal proceedings. In the corporate investigation context,
“[t]hese sanctions include loss of morale, damage to reputation and corporate image, damage to relationships with customers, suppliers, and the government, bars to future business, and (as a consequence of all of this)
significant drops in share price and market share.”95 Similar concerns arise
in the class action context, and corporate employees are deterred from
wrongdoing by seeking to avoid these potential reputational harms.96 This
claim about deterrence tracks corporate crime scholarship explaining that
officers and employees would recognize a decline in “reputational capital”
from a violation and would “have incentive to encourage and monitor colleagues’ compliance with the law” to avoid the “sting of such reputational
effects”97 and securities enforcement scholarship noting that reputational
harm from private enforcement can deter wrongdoing.98 That employees
anticipate and seek to avoid reputational harms that flow either to themselves
or to the institution with which they affiliate deters wrongdoing.99
One type of reputational harm is internal (i.e., harm to the company’s
image with an internal audience). The model of internal reputational harm
explored here builds on social psychology literature. It begins with the idea
that “people’s views of themselves are linked to their views about the status of
the groups to which they belong.”100 Tom Tyler and Steven Blader explain
that “people develop [favorable supportive] attitudes and values” toward
93 Skeel, supra note 80, at 1851 (collecting sources).
94 Sudbury et al., supra note 80, at 21.
95 Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 81, at 1771–72 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at
1771 (“Investigations and convictions of corporations, like those of individuals, often trigger significant extralegal sanctions for the defendants and their employees.”). Cass Sunstein offers a similar explanation of the effect of violating social norms and ties that notion
to the law as a source of social norms. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029–30 (1996).
96 See Rose, supra note 19, at 2222.
97 Buell, supra note 20, at 501.
98 Rose, supra note 19, at 2222.
99 Buell, supra note 20, at 500 (“[R]eputational effects are likely to flow through to
institutional members in ways that deter wrongdoing and encourage compliance efforts.”);
Coffee, supra note 10, at 448 (“Deterrence is an indirect organizational strategy: we raise
the costs of an activity in anticipation that the organization will restrain its agents.”); Rose,
supra note 19, at 2222; Sunstein, supra note 95 (explaining that the most important impact
of social norms is their ex ante effect generating an expectation of shame that tends to
induce compliance).
100 TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 144 (2000); accord id. at 143 (“[W]e argue
that an important function of groups is to provide people with a framework within which
they can construct a social identity.”); see Buell, supra note 20, at 501–02 (explaining that
people’s lives are dominated and perhaps defined by their institutional affiliations).
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their organizations “and engage in [cooperative] behaviors as a way to support their positive sense of themselves.”101 Tyler and Blader distinguish
between two forms of status: “pride” refers to the perceived status of the
group as a whole and “respect” to the way an individual perceives her own
status within the group.102 Both pride and respect play important roles in
whether employees will cooperate with and advance the organization’s
goals,103 which is important to effective and efficient functioning.104
Having their employer labeled a wrongdoer by an authoritative source
like a court, however, can reduce pride.105 Reducing pride in turn jeopardizes whether employees will seek to advance the organization’s goals106 and
can also increase employee turnover.107 This relationship to employee turnover also relies on social identity scholarship. Because social identity plays an
important role in self-image,108 people prefer affiliating with organizations
they view as having high status.109 Thus, if their institution’s social identity is
diminished, people will be tempted to change groups to preserve their selfimage.110
Reputational deterrence occurs because employees want to protect their
organization’s pride as a form of protecting self-identity.111 They thus avoid
actions that would tend to lead to their company becoming embroiled in
101 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 100, at 143; accord id. at 145 (“[P]eople will act in ways
that are designed to enhance the status of the groups to which they belong.”).
102 Id. at 194.
103 Id. at 148 (“[S]tatus judgments are central to shaping cooperative behavior within
the group.”); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Identity and Cooperative Behavior in Groups, 4
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 207, 212 (2001) (“[P]eople who feel greater pride
and respect are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior on behalf of their groups.”);
see also TYLER & BLADER, supra note 100, at 151 (“Membership in a high-status group leads
to a more favorable social identity and to higher feelings of self-esteem and self-worth. It
also leads to greater cooperative behavior.”). This is not to suggest that instrumental reasons for voluntary cooperation such as financial incentives are irrelevant but only, as Tyler
and others have shown, that social identity plays a greater role. See id. at 65.
104 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 100, at 23; Tyler & Blader, supra note 103, at 208.
105 See Buell, supra note 20, at 501–02; see also Charles S. Mishkind et al., The EEO Class
Action in the New Millennium, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1998, at
133, 210–11 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H0-001C, 1998)
(“In the employment context, [class actions] raise heightened concerns where the
employer is large and well known because, inevitably, there will be a battle for the hearts
and minds of both the public and the defendants’ employees which will, in turn, affect the
employer’s relations with its workers . . . .”).
106 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 100, at 150 (explaining that negative status evaluation
can lead individuals to not engage in cooperative behavior).
107 Id. at 161–63; Tyler & Blader, supra note 103, at 218.
108 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 100, at 143.
109 Id. at 180; see also id. at 151 (“Membership in a high-status group leads to a more
favorable social identity and to higher feelings of self-esteem and self-worth.”).
110 Tyler & Blader, supra note 103, at 209; see also TYLER & BLADER, supra note 100, at
150.
111 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 100, at 180.
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legal proceedings that can tarnish organizational pride and prefer instead to
act in ways that will enhance their group’s status.112
This conception of reputational deterrence applies across the
employer’s workforce, though it is likely to be most pronounced with highranking executives. High-ranking executives of large, publicly held corporations, are a “close-knit” and “status-conscious” bunch,113 which means that
these executives would be “tremendously” “embarrass[ed],” “feel ‘tainted’”
amongst family and community members, and “anxious about their chances
for advancement and future prestigious assignments” if their company
received publicity for legal trouble even if the officers themselves were
uninvolved.114 Employees who were involved in or are identified with wrongdoing face difficulty advancing either within their firm or at another firm.115
Based on case studies of major publicity scandals in the 1960’s and 1970’s,
two social scientists concluded that these internal harms were more significant than monetary harm to companies embroiled in scandal.116
Internal reputational harm is not limited to cases that draw media coverage. Rather, many employees—and particularly high-ranking ones—are
likely to be aware of ongoing litigation because it affects their work in some
respect, they have received a litigation hold, because they have read or
helped prepare their company’s SEC disclosures, because these issues came
up while talking around the water cooler, or simply because they pay attention to discussion of their company on social media or the internet.
Another type of reputational harm is external to the corporation, such
as changes in consumer behavior or stock price. These external harms—at
least as to stock price—have been more easily measured empirically. Most of
this work has been done in the corporate crime context. One scholar confirmed “the presence of a reputational penalty and underscores termination
and/or suspension of business relationships with customers as a significant
form of real-world [external] reputational sanction” for corporate crime.117
Two others concluded based on their empirical work spanning 1978 to 1987
that initial press reports of alleged corporate fraud against private victims
corresponded to an average stock value decrease of more than one percent.118 They found that 93.5% of companies’ stock price declines after
news coverage of a criminal investigation or conviction were attributable to
112 Id. at 145.
113 Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
959, 966 (1999); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997).
114 Barnard, supra note 113, at 966–67.
115 Coffee, supra note 10, at 412.
116 BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 243 (1983) (“It was non-financial impacts that executives in all of the companies
reported as the factors which truly hurt and which made them want to avoid a recurrence
even if it cost a great deal of money to try to guarantee this.”).
117 Alexander, supra note 85, at 504.
118 Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 758–59 (1993). The magnitude of a stock
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reputational loss;119 only 6.5% was attributable to formal legal penalties.120
A qualitative study of seventeen cases of corporate wrongdoing found that
adverse publicity reduced earnings in four cases, reduced stock value in seven
cases, and damaged image in fifteen cases.121
Although criminal conviction signifies the strongest form of institutional
blame,122 reputational harm exists in class actions as well.123 Civil litigation
more generally can inflict reputational harm similar to what scholars have
described in corporate crime.124 Similarly, empirical work on civil litigation
and civil enforcement proceedings has found significant reputational harm
to defendants’ stock price due to the proceedings.125
price decline based on allegations of defrauding a government agency was much larger
(five percent). Id.
119 Id. at 784.
120 Id.
121 See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 116, at 231–32.
122 Buell, supra note 20, at 507; Coffee, supra note 10, at 424–25; see also Allen, supra
note 56, at 77 (“Criminal remedies provide the strongest set of deterrence signals.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview 16–17 (NYU Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-36, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2527621 (“Organizational defendants don’t want to admit to criminal behavior, both because doing so will damage their reputations and also because the plea may be
used against them in subsequent civil litigation.”).
123 Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 207 (2003); Rose, supra note 19, at 2222; Sylvia R. Lazos, Note,
Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement
Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 313 (1985). Even Coffee—who argues that the harm
from criminal conviction is greater—acknowledges that “[l]ittle doubt exists that corporations dislike adverse publicity and that unfavorable publicity emanating from an administrative or judicial source has considerable credibility.” Coffee, supra note 10, at 425. But
see Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 35
(2012) (contending that civil liability for corporations does not result in reputational loss).
124 Vijay Sekhon, Enforcement of Material Non-Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 273, 279 (2011) (“[T]he announcement of civil charges against corporations has substantial extralegal [reputational] effects including loss of employee
morale, strained relationships with customers and suppliers, damage to reputation and
corporate image, and a consequent decrease in market value beyond the expected liability
from the charges.” (footnotes omitted)); Skeel, supra note 80, at 1831 & n.75 (“For example, when Denny’s, and later Texaco, were sued for alleged discrimination, the fact that
the lawsuits were civil rather than criminal in nature seems unlikely to have diminished the
damage to the firms’ reputations.”); see also Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 405 (recognizing that civil litigation creates reputational harm).
125 Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits, 27 FIN.
MGMT., Winter 1998, at 5, 6 (“We find that no matter who brings a lawsuit against a firm . . .
defendants experience economically meaningful and statistically significant wealth losses
upon the filing of the suit.”); Karpoff et al., supra note 85, at 600 (calculating reputational
loss following financial fraud enforcement actions, many of which also resulted in class
actions, to be 92.09% of the total loss the firm incurs); Sam Peltzman, The Effects of FTC
Advertising Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 403, 418 (1981) (finding that FTC false advertising
complaints result in stock price dip of 3.25%). But cf. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The
Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 655
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There is also evidence of reputational harm in class actions. Two studies
found significant reputational harm to defendants’ stock prices because of
class actions.126 Two other studies concluded that public attitudes toward
defendants are indeed impaired by class actions.127
Litigation is not necessary for companies to face bad publicity, but legal
process draws attention to and is seen to substantiate allegations.128 “In a
noisy world,”129 many members of the public rely on proxies such as the
existence of or outcome of litigation to overcome substantial information
costs130 of learning details of every allegation and to confer some imprimatur
of legitimacy on those allegations.131 In the product liability context where
consumers would seem to have the greatest incentive to learn about risks,132
producers face market pressure to exploit heuristics and perception biases to
cause consumers to underestimate risks.133 Litigation increases salience by
drawing attention to the allegations,134 which can help combat these efforts
(2005) (finding that market losses due to environmental violations are similar in degree
and correlated to legal penalties).
126 See Amar Gande & Craig M. Lewis, Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 823, 829
(2009) (finding a 4.66% drop in stock price attributable to filing of securities class
actions); Joni Hersch, Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Firm Profitability, 26 J. HUM.
RES. 139, 150 (1991) (finding that EEO “class action suits are associated with a significantly
negative average prediction error of 15.6 percent over the period” spanning from thirty
days before the announcement to thirty days after the announcement). Michael Selmi
found to the contrary—that stock prices do not decline due to an employment discrimination class action filing or settlement—though he recognizes that his finding runs contrary
to the rest of the literature. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class
Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1253,
1260–65, 1267 (2003).
127 Doris Van Doren et al., The Effect of a Class Action Suit on Consumer Attitudes, 11 J. PUB.
POL’Y & MARKETING, Spring 1992, at 45, 49; Mark Peyrot & Doris Van Doren, Effect of a Class
Action Suit on Consumer Repurchase Intentions, 28 J. CONSUMER AFF. 361, 378 (1994).
128 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1445 (2010) (explaining that reputational penalties can only be
brought to bear if consumers are informed of allegations).
129 Buell, supra note 20, at 511.
130 See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, Products Liability, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS § 11.6, at
293 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009) (explaining information costs in product liability
context).
131 Buell, supra note 20, at 511 (arguing that criminal blame creates the strongest form
of institutional blame). Although violating the law does not perfectly equate to wrongdoing that generates reputational harm, the two largely coincide because the law affects social
norms such that violations of law tend to also violate social norms. See Sunstein, supra note
95, at 2031–32.
132 See generally Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 128.
133 Geistfeld, supra note 130, § 11.5, at 292.
134 See John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE
120, 184 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (“The case studies reveal that the
liability system in particular often stimulates media coverage of safety concerns.”); see also
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 147–48 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (recognizing that ending
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(albeit perhaps overly so).135 That product safety suits typically reduce stock
price supports the notion that the market had previously under-perceived
risk.136
The idea that legal process increases reputational harm appears in
tort137 and corporate crime literature.138 In the product liability context,
one study found that “the indirect effect of liability on consumer demand—
operating through adverse publicity about a product’s safety and a manufacturer’s reputation—is often the most significant contribution of liability to
safety. The direct financial costs of liability are usually a relatively minor factor . . . .”139 A similar finding appears across several government investigation contexts.140
Although most of the tort literature focuses on added publicity from
litigation rather than substantiation, one empirical study supports the notion
that substantiation is not limited to criminal proceedings. It found that news
stories about product safety litigation had stronger negative effect on firms’
stock prices than articles that discussed product safety risks but did not discuss litigation.141 The extent to which legal proceedings are seen to substantiate allegations depends on the perceived legitimacy of the process, which is
what ties this discussion to the economic import of compensation.
Reputational harms can occur at all stages of a class action. Because
most class actions are resolved by settlement and many by settlement classes
damaging media coverage over artificial heart valves that could fracture was one reason
that defendant wanted to settle).
135 See Graham, supra note 134, at 184; Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with
Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 271,
277 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005) (explaining that the perceived
probability of certain events are skewed based on the ease with which an instance comes to
the decisionmaker’s mind).
136 Geistfeld, supra note 130, § 11.11, at 303 (collecting sources regarding typical drop
in stock price and explaining that drop indicates that market had previously under-perceived product risk).
137 Graham, supra note 134, at 180–82; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 128, at 1457
(“[A]dverse publicity accompanying litigation can spur market forces.” (citing Graham,
supra note 134, at 180–82)).
138 Buell, supra note 20, at 511.
139 Graham, supra note 134, at 181–82.
140 FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 116, at 243.
141 W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, The Market Response to Product Safety Litigation, 2 J. REG.
ECON. 215, 219 (1990). There are some companies that are impervious to dips in their
external reputation and for whom anticipating such harm thus has no deterrent effect.
Companies that do not have investors and either do not have customers or whose customers are unlikely to care about their reputations fit into this category. Consider debt buyers
and debt collectors. Debt buyers do not have customers in any traditional sense; so long as
their investors do not care about being affiliated with wrongdoing, there is no reason to
anticipate external reputational harm. As to debt collectors, there is no reason to think
their customers care whether their practices are unsavory or illegal unless those practices
seem somehow likely to reflect back on the debt holder. Nonetheless, internal reputational harm should still be a factor even in these contexts.
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rather than settlement following plenary class certification,142 the most
prominent points for reputational harm to occur are the filing of the complaint and the announcement of a settlement.143 If a case does not settle
quickly, however, reputational harm can come from any potentially newsworthy step in the case including motion filings or from any detrimental
information that emerges in discovery or at trial. It is not necessarily the
motions themselves that cause harm; more frequently, they provide a trigger
for coverage of the substantive allegations.
Reputational harm can occur first with the mere filing of a class
action.144 Because of the systemic nature of the harms alleged by a class,145
class actions tend to draw more media scrutiny than individual cases146 and
can be less easily spun by defendants as one-off incidents.147 In one extreme
example, shortly after a wave of lawsuits against HMOs, the defendants’ stock
prices dropped by more than $12 billion.148 Indeed, the few empirical studies on point find that filing of the complaint causes the greatest reputational
harm in class actions.149
142 Settlement classes are those certified for purposes of settlement only and not for
litigation. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 951 (2014) (arguing for elimination of settlement class actions); Thomas Willging &
Emery Lee III, Class Certification and Class Settlement: Findings from Federal Question Cases,
2003–2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 341 (2012) (finding that more than half of class settlements in the past decade were certified as settlement class actions).
143 Filing the complaint and proposing settlement may occur simultaneously. See, e.g.,
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 602 (1997).
144 Gande & Lewis, supra note 126, at 829; Hersch, supra note 126, at 150; see also Buell,
supra note 20, at 510–11 (“[L]egal process, and especially criminal legal process, will tend
to generate publicity that will increase both the depth of observers’ knowledge about an
instance of wrongdoing and the number of observers with knowledge of the wrongdoing.”); Sudbury et al., supra note 80, at 21 (“At the first mention of a potential class action,
even before a complaint is filed in court, the media attention can begin.”).
145 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that claims be sufficiently numerous to
render individual joinder impractical); id. at (a)(2) (requiring that claims raise common
issues of law or fact); id. at (b)(3) (requiring that common questions predominate over
individualized questions); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)
(“[C]laims must depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable
of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”).
146 See Hodges, supra note 123, at 207; see also Sherry E. Clegg, Comment, Employment
Discrimination Class Actions: Why Plaintiffs Must Cover All Their Bases After the Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1087, 1111–12 (2012).
147 See Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 631 (2011) (“[A]n employer can more easily mask discrimination
when challenged on an individual basis than on a class-wide basis.”).
148 Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1358 (2001); David Segal, TagTeam Lawyers Make Businesses Blink, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 1999), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-11/12/091r-111299-idx.html.
149 Gande & Lewis, supra note 126, at 829; see Hersch, supra note 126, at 150.
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Second, news of class settlements can generate reputational harm.150
News of a settlement is likely to trigger media coverage of the underlying
allegations. Moreover, because settling entails refusing to formally defend
the allegations, it may appear to admit some degree of wrongdoing even
when the settlement agreement explicitly provides to the contrary, as settlement agreements typically do.151 The fact of settlement will communicate
with less force than a conviction or a judicial finding of liability because it
provides less procedural assurance of merit. But some observers—both
defendants’ employees and external observers—will view a company’s decision not to contest allegations against it and a judge approving the settlement152 to provide some substantiation.153 That some defendants bargain
for provisions in settlement agreements preventing class counsel from publicizing the settlement bolsters this claim that defendants fear reputational
harm from class action settlements finding their way into the press.154 Consider a few examples of recent settlements where it is difficult to imagine all
employees and customers accepting the decision to pay these amounts rather
than defend the charges as totally innocent. That the NFL agreed to pay
$765 million to resolve the concussion settlement (and later agreed to lift
even that large cap) must look to some—including this author—as less than

150 See Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 709–10
(2013) (mentioning “reputation effects” for companies resulting from trial or settlement).
151 See Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for
Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 451 (2003) (“Voluntary monetary transfers can demonstrate individuals’ acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of
wrongdoing . . . .”); Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
355, 359 (2003) (arguing that agreeing to pay compensation is seen as acknowledging
some degree of wrongdoing or responsibility for harm because “[w]e normally think that
innocence from wrongdoing is a defense in court”); Paul C. Quinn, Comment, The EPA
Guidance on Landowner Liability and the Innocent Landowner Defense: The All Appropriate Inquiry
Standard: Fact or Fiction?, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 179 (1991) (“Corporate entities are very
cognizant of the public’s perception of them and a majority of the public looks upon a
settlement as being tantamount to an admission of guilt.”); see also Richard Frankel, The
Disappearing Opt-Out Right in Punitive-Damages Class Actions, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 563, 608 n.166
(“[D]efendants routinely disclaim wrongdoing in class action settlement agreements.”); cf.
Carolyn J. Paschke, The Qui Tam Provision of the Federal False Claims Act: The Statute in Current Form, Its History and Its Unique Position to Influence the Health Care Industry, 9 J.L. &
HEALTH 163, 174–75 (1995) (noting that “virtually all” qui tam settlements include secrecy
clauses because of sensitivity to public opinion and resulting business harm).
152 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring judicial finding that settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to bind absent class members).
153 See Quinn, supra note 151, at 179.
154 See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement ¶ 115, Pappas v. Naked Juice Co. of Glendora, No.
2:11-cv-08276-JAK-PLA (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2013), ECF No. 118; Settlement Agreement and
General Release ¶ 37, Pearson v. Target Corp., No. 1:11-cv-07972 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2013),
ECF No. 73-1.
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completely innocent.155 Citigroup’s $590 million and $730 million settlements on claims involving subprime mortgages look similar.156
Third, class actions pose further risk of reputational harm as they proceed through various steps in the litigation process.157 Judges Posner’s and
Easterbrook’s versions of the blackmail settlement narrative—that class counsel may “wring settlements from defendants whose legal positions are justified but unpopular”158—suggest that reducing reputational harm is so
important to defendants that it is worth settling very winnable cases.
Every step of the litigation process including briefing or rulings on
motions or trial provides potential triggers for media coverage. A lawyer for
Google recently admitted in open court that trial in an antitrust class action
would likely harm the company’s reputation.159 And news articles about
class certification motions rarely focus on Rule 23 disputes. Rather, they tend
to focus on racier underlying allegations. Consider, for instance, a recent
privacy class action against Facebook that settled for pennies on the available
statutory damages.160 Forbes covered the settlement by highlighting a
Facebook user who claimed to have unwittingly become a pitchman for a
fifty-five-gallon drum of personal lubricant instead of covering the legal issue
of whether misappropriation of a name or likeness under California law is an
inherently individualized injury that rendered certification of a contested litigation class unlikely.161 Pending lawsuits expose the defendant and its
employees to reputational harm, which often prompts relatively quick settle155 In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 422-23
(3d Cir. 2016) (affirming approval of class action settlement creating an “uncapped Monetary Award Fund that provides compensation for retired players who submit proof of certain diagnoses” and recounting the district court’s earlier refusal to approve a settlement
because this amount was capped).
156 See In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re
Citigroup Inc. Bond Litig., 296 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
157 See Marissa L. Bracke, Note, Where Improper Purposes Lead, Inadequate Protections Follow: Integrating the Rule 11 Improper Purpose Inquiry with the Rule 23 Protections for Absent Class
Members, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 366 (2006) (“Class actions often provide the potential for
large fee payouts for the class’s attorney, as well as negative media attention and economically harmful litigation for the defendant.” (citing Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of
Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 736 (1998))).
158 Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999); see also In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the likelihood that
plaintiffs’ claims “lack legal merit” “despite their human appeal”). But see Charles Silver,
“We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (arguing that none of the various iterations of the blackmail settlement narrative are
persuasive).
159 Transcript of Proceedings at 42, In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. C11-02509 LHK (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2014) (court: “It’s not just financial risks [for the
defendants from going to trial]. It’s other damage that your companies would get in trying
to recruit other employees and what that would do to your image, to your goodwill.”); id.
(response from counsel for Google: “I’m not denying that one bit.”).
160 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
161 Kashmir Hill, Facebook User Unwittingly Becomes Sex Lube Pitchman Thanks to Sponsored
Stories, FORBES.COM (Feb. 28, 2012, 10:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
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ment. For instance, Denny’s, Inc.’s quick settlements of race discrimination
class actions are attributed at least in part to the CEO’s fear that publicity
from those pending cases would jeopardize another business endeavor of
his—namely, buying an NFL franchise.162
Lastly, defendants can be harmed by bad facts that emerge in discovery,
through investigation of claims, or at trial.163 With these sources of reputational harms, procedural legitimacy is not important because the process is
not providing a proxy for merit.164 Rather, discovery can provide proof of
the underlying wrong, and trial may reveal that proof publicly.165 The smoking gun renders the defendant’s protestations of innocence hollow and proxies unnecessary. Consider the product liability context. “Whether or not
they will be held liable, firms do not want their products to harm their customers because, if this occurs, firms will tend to lose business and/or have to
lower their prices as a consequence.”166 Yet the extent to which these concerns actually lead firms to produce safe products depends on the assumption that consumers will learn of the risk.167 And defendants of course
typically seek to keep documents confidential that might otherwise provide
such information.168
2012/02/28/facebook-user-unwittingly-becomes-sex-lube-pitchman-thanks-to-sponsoredstories/. The headline alone is telling.
162 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, The Nation; Denny’s Gets a Bill for the Side Orders of Bigotry,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/29/weekinreview/thenation-denny-s-gets-a-bill-for-the-side-orders-of-bigotry.html?pagewanted=all (implying that
settling the cases and reaching an agreement with the NAACP were efforts to enable
Denny’s CEO to buy the Carolina Panthers); Faye Rice, Denny’s Changes Its Spots, FORTUNE,
May 13, 1996, at 133, 134 (explaining that “negative press” from the suit “could have blown
the deal” to buy the Panthers).
163 See Lazos, supra note 123, at 313. As a practical matter, discovery plays a more
important role than trial in this context. Although trial might more effectively capture
public attention, trials are too infrequent in damages class actions to play a meaningful
role in publicizing bad facts. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action
Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 812 (2010) (“[V]irtually all
cases certified as class actions and not dismissed before trial end in settlement.”).
164 See Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 416–17 (explaining that a nonlegal sanction
may be triggered by committing an underlying wrong).
165 At a settlement fairness hearing, Judge Koh explicitly raised this point. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 159, at 41 (Court: “[H]ow much did you all want to
gamble with all of that information coming out? How much did you all want to go to trial
on this?”); Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement at 12,
In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2014) (recounting evidence
of an internal Apple email instructing recruiters, which stated, “Please add Google to your
‘hands-off’ list. We recently agreed not to recruit from one another . . . .”).
166 Shavell, supra note 37, at 590.
167 Id. at 590–91; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 128, at 1445–46 & n.22 (recognizing the same and acknowledging that “consumers are not perfectly informed in fact”).
168 As a practical matter, in my experience, when counsel for both sides consent to
filing documents under seal, courts tend to approve this arrangement. In one interesting
recent case, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed a ruling denying an intervenor’s motion
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Consider a few prominent examples of discovery harm. Merrill Lynch’s
former CEO testified at a deposition in a race-discrimination class action that
black brokers might have had a harder time at the company than white brokers because the firm’s prospective clients are mostly white and might be less
trusting of a broker of a different race.169 In Wal-Mart, class-member declarations about a business meeting held at a Hooters restaurant and a visit to
an adult dance club on a business trip were less than ideal for public relations170 even though they proved detrimental to the plaintiffs on class certification.171 These class-member declarations in Wal-Mart were publicly filed
documents discussed in and filed concurrently with the most important and
highest-profile filing in the case: the motion for class certification. So too
were they discussed in the Supreme Court briefing.
Negative press coverage from class actions at any of these phases may
sprawl rather than focusing on the particular class action or settlement at
issue, which exacerbates the concern over anticipated reputational harm.172
In an article reporting on a sex-discrimination class action against Goldman
Sachs, the author reminded readers about the firm’s recent “public relations
beating” including a $550 million SEC settlement.173 An article two years
later about a securities class action regarding subprime mortgages mentioned the same SEC settlement.174 More recently, in a case against Apple
for denying warranties due to false positive readings on a liquid damage indicator on the iPhone, one news story led with the agreement to settle for $53
million but followed by criticizing Apple’s warranty practices regarding its
iPod Nano, the quality of iPod batteries, and the iPhone replacement and
repair process in China.175 In an era of online news with open comment
to unseal in a product liability case for using an insufficiently stringent standard in denying
the motion. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2016).
169 McGeehan, supra note 45.
170 Female Wal-Mart Workers: Meetings Held at Strip Clubs, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2003, 8:30
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2003-04-29-walmart-discrimina
tion-suit_x.htm (contending that female managers testified that business meetings have
been held in strip clubs and Hooters restaurants); see also Hawkes, supra note 46.
171 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011). Even though class
action discovery is often separated into class-stage and merits-stage phases, discovery
related to the merits may nonetheless be available at the class stage in many instances
because courts cannot ignore factual disputes when ruling on Rule 23 issues just because
those disputes overlap with the merits. Id. at 2551–52.
172 See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 116, at 228 (explaining that their case studies
“illustrated in varying degrees how adverse publicity concerning one alleged wrongdoing
can snowball into unfavorable coverage over other, unrelated, issues”).
173 Peter Lattman, 3 Women Claim Bias at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/business/16bias.html.
174 REUTERS, Class Action Against Goldman Can Proceed, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/business/class-action-against-goldman-canproceed-judge-rules.html.
175 Ian Sherr, Apple Settles iPhone Water Damage Lawsuit for $53 Million, WALL ST. J. (May
28, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323855804578511720
535072276.
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threads for consumers and pervasive social media, a news story like the Apple
settlement spurs public griping that can multiply quickly.176
In sum, as with criminal cases, class actions can generate reputational
harm to defendants. The mere facts of declining to contest the allegations
and paying money to alleged victims may imply wrongdoing even though the
settlement agreement expressly provides to the contrary. The procedural
legitimacy of the class device determines the extent to which class actions
serve as a proxy for the public that allegations are meritorious. Reputational
harm typically results from the filing of a class complaint and the fact of
settlement and may be further triggered throughout the litigation including
by the emergence of bad facts in discovery or at trial.
Although estimating the magnitude of the likely reputational harm from
a particular lawsuit may be fraught, defendants can anticipate bearing some
reputational harm if suit is filed—anticipating that harm contributes to class
action deterrence.177 The notion that anticipating reputational harm from
suit deters wrongdoing is familiar in the medical malpractice context.178
There, scholars are typically concerned that reputational deterrence is too
powerful because it results in inefficient, defensive medicine.179 Similarly,
class actions can create reputational deterrence that risks overdeterrence,
especially if the optimization problem focuses only on damages and ignores
reputational deterrence.
B.

Why Reputational Harm Matters for Optimizing Deterrence

Given the evidence that the threat of reputational harm deters wrongdoing, how should social policymakers account for reputational deterrence
when seeking to optimize deterrence in class litigation? In short, it should be
176 David Kravets, Apple Agrees to Pay $53M to Settle iPhone Warranty Lawsuit, WIRED (Apr.
11, 2013), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2013/04/iphone-warranty-flap; see also
Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 420 (explaining—at a time when Facebook membership
was still limited to those with college affiliations and Twitter did not exist—that nonlegal
sanctions are most effective in cyberspace).
177 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 128, at 1443 (“Market forces can provide firms
with an incentive to improve product safety, for if consumers believe that the risk of a
product is high, they will either avoid buying the product or will not pay as much for it as
they otherwise would.”).
178 See, e.g., James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641,
1668–69 (2008) (explaining “the prevalence of defensive medicine” based on “the deterrent effect” of costs including “the significant reputational effects” of a medical malpractice claim being filed); Robert Quinn, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The Reputation Effect
and Defensive Medicine, 65 J. RISK & INS. 467, 468 (1998) (“The desire to avoid these implicit
costs [including loss of reputation] will give an incentive to the physician to behave in a
safer, less risky manner.”).
179 See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 178, at 1668–69; Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1595, 1606 (2002) (“[A] defensive-medicine response to perceived malpractice risk is really
a measure of overdeterrence or excessive precaution-taking, rather than true deterrence of
substandard care.”).
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deducted from the magnitude of victim harm to achieve ideal net damages
because it is not a deadweight loss.180
If reputational harm were a deadweight loss to defendants, it would
rightly be excluded when calculating damages because defendants would
already internalize it.181 If reputational harm to the defendant generates
benefit for others, however, reputational harm plays an important role in
calibrating optimal deterrence.182
Cooter and Porat rightly explain that reputational harm is typically not a
deadweight loss.183 Rather, reputational harm often generates three benefits: conveying information about the wrongdoer to potential victims to help
them avoid future harm, benefiting competitors of the wrongdoer, and deterring the particular wrongdoer and others because they anticipate this extralegal harm.184 Consider what it would mean to embrace a contrary,
deadweight-loss view185: accepting that publicity from a lawsuit would not
make a single person aware of potential future harm, deter a single firm
(including the specific defendant), or benefit competitors by harming the
competition. That is highly implausible and contrary to literature explaining
that litigation makes consumers more aware of potential risks.186
To account for the transfer value of reputational harms, courts would
ideally achieve optimal deterrence by deducting the value of the benefits
from the amount of harm the victim has suffered to calculate the amount of
net damages necessary in an individual case.187 Otherwise, the defendant’s
expected sanction would exceed the expected social harm.188 Because these
benefits are difficult to calculate practically, however, Cooter and Porat recommend that courts deduct the extent of the reputational harm as a proxy
180 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 405–10. Such deductions could lead to perverse
results if viewed from the perspective of trying to redress victims’ harm rather than optimize deterrence for potential defendants. But that difference goes to the lexically prior
questions of what that law should be trying to achieve and a battle of economic versus
corrective justice objectives that is assumed away by this Article’s frame.
181 For a more detailed explanation, see id. at 403–10.
182 Id. at 405–10.
183 Id. at 405–08.
184 Id. at 401, 405–08.
185 Law-and-economics scholarship on optimal deterrence—excluding that of Cooter
and Porat—seems to assume implicitly that reputational harm effectuates a deadweight
loss. See Logue, supra note 85, at 2351.
186 See Shavell, supra note 37, at 605 (explaining that litigation can bring damaging
facts to light and that “if the public learns about the defect, perhaps people can take precautions to reduce harm and, further, the firm will suffer adverse consequences, leading to
improved deterrence”); see also LoPucki, supra note 43, at 510 (“Litigation is when the facts
come out.”); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 210 (2000) (“Privatized processes . . . allow the
parties to keep the matter secret. This may result in the public, or even the government,
lacking information about important issues of public health or safety or product
reliability.”).
187 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 409.
188 Id.
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for third-party benefit from that harm.189 Accordingly, optimal deterrence
requires that potential defendants anticipate an award of damages equal to
victim harm minus third-party benefits of the defendant’s reputational harm
(or, as a proxy, victim harm minus reputational harm).
Whichever method is used to calculate the deduction, the magnitude of
reputational harm and the benefits that it creates can be significant.190 An
empirical study of stock market impacts from employment discrimination
class actions found that the average drop on the day a case is announced “is
triple that of the average direct costs to the firm of settling the case.”191
Securities enforcement proceedings generate reputational losses exceeding
legal penalties by more than 7.5 times.192 In the criminal context, one study
concluded that the reputational cost of corporate fraud encompassed 93.5%
of the relevant stock market declines.193
Moreover, for deterrence purposes, it is not important whether reputational harm will actually be significant in a particular case but rather whether
firms fear significant reputational harm from litigation when they choose
levels of activity and safety precautions.194 And expected reputational harm
can be significant. “[F]irm managers believe that serious legal proceedings
. . . can have potentially devastating effects on business.”195 Or as another
study put it, “corporations fear the sting of adverse publicity attacks on their
reputations more than they fear the law itself.”196
In sum, class actions generate significant reputational harm, particularly
when filed, settled, or when they unearth evidence of wrongdoing. And
reputational harms cannot be ignored for purpose of optimizing deterrence
because they do not create a deadweight private loss.
III. COMPENSATIONALISM
When the award was finally settled, [the securities enforcer] kept the money
[instead of giving it to the victims]. I likened it to the call to the sheriff’s
office when you report your car stolen, the sheriff calls you back two days
later and says, “Good news, we found the car; bad news is, I am keeping
it.”197
189 Id. at 415–16.
190 Id. at 401, 420 (explaining that their approach “would significantly reduce damages
[from existing levels] in torts and contracts,” “especially in close-knit communities and
cyberspace where nonlegal sanctions work”).
191 Hersch, supra note 126, at 152.
192 Karpoff et al., supra note 85, at 582.
193 Karpoff & Lott, supra note 118, at 784.
194 Rose, supra note 51, at 1322; Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 843.
195 Buell, supra note 90, at 103.
196 FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 116, at 249; see also id. at 356 n.16 (recognizing
that the reputational harm that companies fear is related to enforcement of law).
197 It’s Only Fair: Returning Money to Defrauded Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong.
1–2 (2003) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Baker, Chairman, H. Subcomm.) [hereinafter
It’s Only Fair].
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This Part contends that as a descriptive matter, the public values compensation in class actions, as seen largely through Congress’s actions and its
rhetoric surrounding those actions.198 Indeed, scholars have widely recognized that the public views compensating victims as an important aim—if not
the sole aim—of civil litigation. As one prominent scholar puts it, “[i]t could
hardly be controverted that many private citizens find . . . lawsuits [in which
claimants are not meaningfully compensated] to be politically unwise, economically reckless, and morally offensive.”199 Another prominent scholar
explains, “The ‘aroma of gross profiteering’ that many perceive rising from
damage class actions troubles even those who support continuance of damage class actions and fuels the controversy over them.”200
That the public values compensation is important because it means that
compensation plays an important role in the magnitude of class actions’
reputational deterrence, as explained below.201
A.

Congressional Compensationalism

The most significant legislative changes to modern class action practice—CAFA and the PSLRA—claimed to protect victim compensation.
Nowhere is this congressional sentiment clearer than in CAFA. Congress
passed CAFA with resounding bipartisan support,202 largely behind rhetoric
criticizing settlements where victims were left with nothing more than a coupon for a discount on their next purchase from the defendant.203
In different contexts, both the FAIR Funds Act and the FTC Improvement Act allow federal agencies to displace (or at least supplement) the tradi198 The Supreme Court too has said that victim compensation plays an important role
in class actions. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it
is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective
redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (recognizing that petitioner could not recover anything on his seventy-dollar claim without a class action). Similarly, many lower courts have adopted the
private law conception of class actions that focuses on compensation. See Myriam Gilles,
Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 308–10 (2010). The executive branch too has sought to preserve a
role for compensation. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 125–28.
199 MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 160 (2009).
200 Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and
Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 199 (2001) (footnote omitted)
(quoting John P. Frank, Whither Rule 23: Memorandum to the Honorable Patrick Higginbotham (Apr. 28, 1995) (on file with author)).
201 See infra Part IV.
202 David Marcus, Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class Actions, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 157, 165 & n.49 (2010) (recounting the Senate vote of 72-26 and the
House vote of 279-149).
203 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(“Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions . . . such as where—
(A) counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with coupons or other
awards of little or no value . . . .”).
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tional role of private class actions and pursue victim compensation. The
legislative history of both statutes similarly reveals Congress creating compensatory tools for government enforcement while claiming dissatisfaction with
victim compensation in class actions.204
Whether Congress actually sought to protect the public’s preferences for
compensation in civil litigation or whether that contention was merely rhetorical,205 that Congress couched its efforts in compensatory terms signals a
belief amongst Members that the public values compensation in civil
litigation.
1.

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005

CAFA—the most significant legislative change to class actions—provides
a stark example of Congress’s narrative about protecting compensation and
its claim that lack of compensation undermined the social legitimacy of the
class device.206 CAFA followed years of “significant criticism due to the great
imbalance between the often worthless coupons that class members received
and the sizeable fees their attorneys reaped.”207 The congressional debate
was marked from start to finish by “invok[ing] the large fees that accompanied worthless coupons as evidence of a ‘broken’ system that produced ‘outrageous decisions.’”208 Or as the text of the final bill explained, the lack of
compensation for victims had “undermined public respect for our judicial
system.”209 That CAFA passed with strong, bipartisan support suggests that
the narrative of insufficient compensation becoming a problem for class
actions’ legitimacy and reining in runaway attorneys’ fees gained traction or
at least proved popular enough to provide cover for other objectives.210
204 See infra subsections III.A.3–4.
205 Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423, 425–28 (1988) (collecting sources questioning the notion that a legislature can
have a coherent purpose).
206 Marcus, supra note 202, at 164; see also Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(3)(A); 151
CONG. REC. 1826 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[M]any of today’s class actions are
nothing more than business opportunities for some lawyers to strike it rich and too often
they have little, if anything, to do with fairly compensating the injured class members.”);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.61 (2004) (describing “granting class
members illusory nonmonetary benefits, such as discount coupons” as “recurring potential
abuse[ ] in class action litigation”).
207 Marcus, supra note 202, at 164.
208 Id. at 165 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 151 CONG. REC. 2647 (2005) (statement of
Rep. Jackson-Lee); 151 CONG. REC. 2072 (2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter); see also Jay
Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 700 (2013) (“In enacting CAFA,
Congress fashioned a comprehensive narrative about the nature of American class actions:
Class actions were being abused, particularly in certain state courts. . . . [P]laintiffs rarely
benefitted from these settlements.” (footnote omitted)).
209 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 4; see
also id. § 2(a)(3)(A) (finding that class counsel often receive large fees while harming the
class members who receive little or no value).
210 Marcus, supra note 202, at 165; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 208, at 704 (“[W]e are
living in CAFA’s world: a world of wary and grudging acceptance of class actions in which
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To address this compensation problem, Congress required courts awarding contingency-based attorneys’ fees in coupon settlement cases to determine the award based on the value of coupons actually redeemed rather than
the theoretical value of coupons issued.211 Moreover, Congress required
courts to issue a written finding after a hearing that proposed coupon settlements are “fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members” before such
settlements could be approved.212 CAFA’s coupon settlement provisions
help to protect some role for class action compensation.
2.

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

The PSLRA too was pitched as a means to provide more meaningful
compensation to class members.213 The conference report describes “testimony that counsel in securities class actions often receive a disproportionate
share of settlement awards”214 and testimony about “rampant” “manipulation
by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent,”215
sounding much like the charges critics would levy against all class actions ten
years later in support of CAFA. Although the findings in the PSLRA regarding compensation are not as explicit on the face of the legislation as in CAFA,
the PSLRA too found Members of Congress claiming to protect victim
compensation.
Congress left its mandate vague but linked class compensation to attorney compensation. It provided that “[t]otal attorneys’ fees and expenses
awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest
actually paid to the class.”216 In so doing, like CAFA’s coupon settlement
provision, the PSLRA linked attorneys’ fees to actual victim compensation.
Linking fees to compensation protects compensation by tying it to the
agent’s (class counsel’s) incentives.217 If victims were not compensated,
truly deserving class members can be rescued from the avarice of counsel only through the
vigorous exercise of federal oversight.”).
211 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012).
212 Id. § 1712(e).
213 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 123 (“Legislative reforms, such as the 1995
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA), have been explicit in their intent to provide more meaningful investor and class
member compensation.” (footnotes omitted)); Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities
Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 641–42 (1997) (“A central
theme of the legislative history [of the PSLRA] is that plaintiffs’ lawyers, rather than faithfully representing investors, were acting for their own benefit.”).
214 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 36 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 735.
215 Id. at 31.
216 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6) (2012); see also id. § 78u-4(a)(6).
217 See Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 366 (“The key issue is the guarantee that the agent
be the faithful guardian of the interests of the class.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL508.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 31

compensation’s role in deterrence

30-AUG-16

14:37

2027

neither would attorneys be. Much like CAFA, the PSLRA garnered broad
support in Congress.218
3.

FAIR Funds Act

The FAIR219 Funds Act220 too was headlined by rhetoric evincing discontent with securities class actions’ inefficacy at victim compensation.221
The most powerful evidence comes from Congressman Baker, the Member
who proposed FAIR Funds as an alternative to the traditional compensatory
mechanism for securities violations: the private class action.222 The quote in
the epigraph above, analogizing compensation-less cases to the sheriff finding and keeping a stolen car, is his.223
The statute authorizes the SEC to obtain and distribute compensation to
victims.224 As Adam Zimmerman has explained, government distribution of
compensation without class actions’ procedural protections raises fairness
concerns,225 which makes it all the more striking that Congress gave the SEC
this authority.226
4.

FTC Improvement Act

Much like the FAIR Funds Act for the SEC that came decades later, in
1975, Congress authorized the FTC to pursue compensatory remedies on
behalf of consumers.227 And the legislative history of the FTC Improvement
218 Chauncey M. Lane, Comment, To Plead or Not to Plead: The Plaintiff’s Growing Burden
in Securities Class Action Litigation, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 615, 629 n.95 (2009) (recounting
veto-override votes of 319-100 in the House 68-30 in the Senate for the PSLRA).
219 FAIR stands for Federal Account for Investor Restitution. Verity Winship, Fair Funds
and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2008).
220 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784.
221 148 CONG. REC. 13351 (2002) (statement of Rep. Baker) (proposing that the SEC be
required to distribute ninety percent or more of ill-gotten gains to defrauded investors,
which he explained was far better than “tak[ing] corporate wealth and giv[ing] it to trial
lawyer[s]”); see also Jonathan Peterson, Corporate Fraud Fund on Track, Officials Say; $2.6
Billion Collected for Investors, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 28, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com
/2004-09-28/business/0409280221_1_sec-enforcement-effort-fair-funds-nevis-capital-man
agement (“When corporate executives make out like bandits, the money ought to go back
to the investors, not to trial lawyers.” (quoting Rep. Michael Oxley)); see also Rep. Richard
Baker, The Election and Your 401(k), NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2006), http://
www.nationalreview.com/node/219131/print (contrasting the SEC’s collections under the
Fair Funds provision with “[r]unaway litigation”).
222 See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 529–33 (2011).
223 It’s Only Fair, supra note 197, at 1–2.
224 Winship, supra note 219, at 1103 (“The Fair Fund provision of Sarbanes-Oxley
allows the SEC to distribute money penalties to injured investors, heralding a new compensatory role for the agency.”).
225 Zimmerman, supra note 222, at 504–07.
226 See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 151, at 369–72 (explaining that distributive fairness is important to the public perception of legitimacy).
227 Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 206(a), 88 Stat. 2183, 2201–02 (1975).
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Act too contains rhetoric criticizing the class action for lack of compensation.
A House report explained that “the promise of actual consumer redress that
they can offer” was “illusory and misleading.”228
Accordingly, Congress afforded the FTC the ability to file its own civil
action.229 The conference report recognized that the existence of a government redress action would afford at least a partial defense to defendants in
private civil actions.230 In so stating, the conference committee acknowledged that government enforcement would somewhat displace private—and
often class—litigation.
B.

Popular Compensationalism

Congressional rhetoric regarding protecting compensation that Members used to reform or partially displace class actions evinces a broader public
sentiment about civil litigation. These four statutes may have been genuine
efforts to implement the public’s concerns about protecting victim compensation.231 But even if not, that Congress sought to couch its efforts in compensationalist rhetoric indicates that at least some Members view victim
compensation as popular with their voters. If Congressman Baker’s colorful
analogy about the stolen car was merely a ruse, that he used the analogy at all
speaks meaningfully about his view of his voters’ sentiment surrounding compensation and perhaps of American voters more broadly. CAFA is often
viewed largely as an attack on trial lawyers—at least plaintiffs’ class action
lawyers.232 That CAFA passed with broad bipartisan support while attacking
lawyers taking money from victims suggests that Members of Congress
thought compensationalist sentiment would make the bill more politically
popular.233 Accordingly, the rhetoric behind these four pieces of legislation
affecting class actions reveals, by proxy, public compensationalist sentiment.
228 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 82 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7748.
229 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a) (2012).
230 S. REP. NO. 93-1408, at 41 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7755,
7773; see also 15 U.S.C. § 57b(e).
231 See Paul R. Verkuil, A Judge of Character, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 11, 14–15 (2000) (“Members of Congress—even powerful ones—are in the business of serving constituents, not
private interests.”); James M. DeMarco, Note, Lobbying the Legislature in the Republic: Why
Lobby Reform Is Unimportant, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 599, 621 (1994) (“Representatives assure their reelection by pleasing constituents’ locally oriented desires . . . .”).
232 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008) (describing CAFA as one of a “trio of
‘tort reform’ measures sought by the Bush Administration” coupled with “unrelenting
attacks on lawyers in general and plaintiffs’ lawyers in particular”); Nan S. Ellis, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 86–87 (2009) (“The
lawyer is held forth as the chief ‘culprit’ responsible for the pathological tort system. He is
both greedy and manipulative.” (footnote omitted) (quoting MARC GALANTER, LOWERING
THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 9 (2006))).
233 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 2(a)(2)(C), (3)(A), 119
Stat. 4.
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Judge Weinstein, who has been deeply involved in American complex
litigation, has expressed similar concern that paying attorneys too much and
victims too little jeopardizes the legitimacy of aggregation devices. In the
Zyprexa multidistrict litigation,234 he set aside the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ contingency fee arrangements and instead set an overall compensation scheme
across the litigation.235 In so doing, he noted that the litigation shared many
characteristics of a class action, characterizing it as a quasi–class action.236
Giving too little money to plaintiffs and too much to lawyers would “be
viewed as abusive by the public,” he explained, and preserving the “[p]ublic
understanding of the fairness of the judicial process” allows mass actions to
continue to provide “an important tool for the protection of consumers in
our modern corporate society.”237
In the 9/11 first responders’ litigation, Judge Hellerstein similarly
reduced the contractual attorneys’ fees, based (albeit less explicitly) on seemingly similar concerns about the legitimacy of the process.238
Much like Judges Weinstein and Hellerstein, the United States Judicial
Conference as a whole expressed similar concern about undercompensating
victims in class actions jeopardizing the legitimacy of civil litigation.239
Polling data too supports the claim that the American public values compensation as an important component of class actions. In a recent poll, only
half of respondents said that most class action suits currently filed in the
United States are justified.240 Eighty-three percent said that settlements
should require cash payments to claimants.241 Another poll found that sev-

234 Multidistrict litigation is a non-class form of aggregation authorized by statute in
which cases are consolidated before a single court for pretrial purposes and are typically
resolved via settlement at that stage. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 71, 73 (2015) (citing statistics demonstrating that less than 3% of cases transferred through the MDL process are ever
remanded to their original districts).
235 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
236 Id. at 491.
237 Id. at 494; see also Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of Aggregate Litigation:
The Past as Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 839, 890–91 (2013) (recognizing merit in Judge
Weinstein’s approach of controlling attorneys’ fees to protect the legitimacy of aggregation
devices).
238 See Transcript of Status Conference at 54, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 1:21-mc-00100-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2010), ECF No. 2037 (“This is different. This is
9/11. This is a special law of commons. This is a case that’s dominated my docket . . . .”).
239 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 19 (“The award of large attorney
fees in the absence of meaningful recoveries by class members in some class actions brings
the civil justice system into disrepute.”).
240 LANGER RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, DRI, THE ANNUAL DRI NATIONAL POLL ON THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: CLASS ACTION, JUDICIAL FUNDING, AND POTENTIAL JUROR BIAS 3, 5 (2013).
241 Id. at 5.
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enty-four percent of respondents indicated that class actions “drive[ ] up
prices and should be restrained.”242
Some readers may be understandably skeptical of drawing any conclusion about popular sentiment from polling data—especially polls conducted
by defense-oriented groups. Nonetheless, even scholars who have argued
that compensation has no normative value recognize descriptively that the
American public seeks compensation from class actions.243
Accordingly, based on scholarly consensus, congressional rhetoric, the
explicit view of two prominent complex litigation jurists, the Judicial Conference, and polling data, it is fair to say that the American public values compensating victims as an important objective of class actions.
IV. HOW COMPENSATION AFFECTS DETERRENCE
Compensationalist sentiment is important because there is reason to
think that it links compensation to reputational deterrence in class actions.
Because the public values compensation, the extent to which victims are typically compensated in class actions plays a role in class actions’ procedural
legitimacy. The procedural legitimacy of class actions in turn affects how
strongly defendants’ employees and the public perceive class action filing or
settlement to signal wrongdoing. The signaling effect in turn plays an important role in how strongly defendants are deterred by anticipating reputational harm. In short, lack of compensation tends to signal frivolousness to
casual observers because it thwarts public expectations of compensation and
the public perception of distributional fairness, which in turn undermines
reputational deterrence.
I do not mean to suggest that reputational deterrence depends entirely
on the extent to which victims are compensated in class actions. It doesn’t.
Rather, the claim is that the level of compensation has some effect on reputational deterrence.244 Compensation-less class actions would bolster defendants’ ability to portray class action filings or settlements as mere nuisances
generated by money-grubbing plaintiffs’ lawyers. Lack of compensation also
supports the narrative that there are no victims because there was no
harm.245
The magnitude of reputational deterrence varies based on both the procedural legitimacy of class actions and the likely underlying facts of any case
242 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Poll Shows Americans Want
Class Action Reform (Mar. 4, 2003), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/chamberpoll-shows-americans-want-class-action-reform.
243 Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 129–31; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at
2075 (acknowledging political difficulty if judges were to award 100% attorneys’ fees in
part because they would incur public ire).
244 The magnitude of compensation’s effect on reputational deterrence in class actions
generally or in particular subject areas would benefit from empirical study.
245 See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the
Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 31 (1993) (explaining that the public
typically views compensation as restoring a balance between injurer and victim).
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in particular.246 The perception of class actions writ large is where compensation plays its biggest role; as compensation decreases, so too does legitimacy of the class device. To the extent that the legitimacy of the procedural
device is undermined, settlement sends a weaker signal about the allegations’
merit to defendants’ employees and the public.247
Lack of victim compensation and the resulting harm to procedural legitimacy animated much of the legislation and judicial action described in the
previous section.248 To quickly review the most prominent evidence, concern about the connection between compensation and procedural legitimacy
underlies Judge Weinstein’s decision to reduce contractual attorneys’ fees in
the Zyprexa litigation out of concern that too little compensation would “be
viewed as abusive by the public” and would undermine the public perception
“of the fairness of the judicial process.”249 A Judicial Conference report recommending an amendment to Rule 23 regarding attorneys’ fees said that
“[t]he award of large attorney fees in the absence of meaningful recoveries
by class members in some class actions brings the civil justice system into
disrepute.”250 Moreover, a well-known class action plaintiffs’ lawyer admitted
before Congress that the “public sees the lawyers on both sides . . . as the only
winners in [class actions]. This . . . perception [by] a large portion of the
public . . . erodes the image of the American justice system.”251
This negative public reaction to poorly compensatory class settlements
may be explained by the behavioral concept of strong reciprocity.252 In
short, individuals respond “kindly toward actions that are perceived to be
kind and hostily toward actions that are perceived to be hostile” based on the

246 See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 6, 8
(1999) (explaining that reputational effect of shareholder suits depends both on expressive value of shareholder suits generally and on the substance of the claim).
247 See Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of
Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 514 (2013) (arguing that “legitimacy of the public enforcement” plays an important role in deterrent effect). Buell makes this point when discussing
admissions of wrongdoing in settlements and argues that they enhance the legitimacy of
the enforcement proceeding. Id. The same result would follow if class actions were to
require defendants to admit wrongdoing, but that requirement would probably prove too
burdensome for defendants to accept in most instances. See Buell, supra note 20, at 507
n.153 (explaining that SEC policy not requiring admissions to settle cases was designed to
avoid preclusive effect from serving as a hurdle to settlements); Buell, supra note 90, at 99
(“[F]irms would mightily resist settlements with devastating potential in collateral civil
litigation.”).
248 See supra Part III.
249 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
250 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 19.
251 Mass Torts and Class Action Lawsuits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 117 (1998) (statement of Elizabeth J.
Cabraser, Partner, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP).
252 I am grateful to Mark Geistfeld for this suggestion.
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fairness or unfairness of the intention underlying the action.253 That perception of fairness depends on “the equitability of the payoff distribution.”254
How the public reacts to class settlements therefore depends on its perception of the equitability of distribution of the proceeds.255 Its sense of equitable distribution favors money going to victims who have been harmed over
others because compensation is seen as setting “the balance right between
the injurer, if any, and the victim.”256
Let us then consider the connection between procedural legitimacy and
reputational harm. In short, “[n]o shame is attached to being the victim of
an unfair proceeding.”257 Defendants’ employees will not perceive a suit to
strongly signal wrongdoing or tarnish their self-image by implication if they
view the procedure as illegitimate.258 One scholar argues that the deterrent
effect of shareholder derivative suits has already been undermined by directors’ and others’ perception that these suits are frivolous.259
Procedural legitimacy likely affects external reputational harm similarly;260 more importantly for deterrence, however, procedural legitimacy
similarly affects firms’ expectations of external reputational harm because the
false consensus effect leads firms’ employees to expect that others will react
as they do.261 Attempting to anticipate something as depersonalized as general public reaction may exacerbate this tendency.262
253

Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in MORAL SENTIMATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 151,
153 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005).
254 Id.
255 Id.; see also Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 151, at 369–72 (explaining the importance of distributive fairness).
256 Baron & Ritov, supra note 245, at 17, 31 (finding that many respondents would
award higher damages when given a prompt of money going directly to victims than when
the money was to go elsewhere) see also Coffee, supra note 10, at 434-35 & n.183 (recognizing that courts are willing to impose high penalities when victims are compensated).
257 Hawkins, supra note 20, at 602; see also Buell, supra note 90, at 90 (“[T]he reputational sanction[ ] comes largely from the category of the proceeding itself.”).
258 Hawkins, supra note 20, at 602.
259 See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 129 (2008) (“[T]he defendants in derivative suits are often
viewed as unfortunate victims of a flawed litigation system, rather than as actual wrongdoers, a perception that limits the deterrent impact of this litigation.” (citing Cox, supra note
246, at 8)).
260 Cox, supra note 246, at 6 (observing that “[c]harges of usurping corporate opportunities, self-dealing and insider trading will fail to convey the social condemnation for such
misconduct” if shareholder suits are commonly understood to be frivolous).
261 See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS
23 (2012) (claiming that the “false consensus effect” leads people to “believe that their
behavior, choices, and beliefs are typical” of others’).
262 Gary Marks & Norman Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect: An
Empirical and Theoretical Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 75–76 (1987) (suggesting that when
asked to estimate consensus among abstract groups, subjects think about specific individuals close to them).
MENTS AND
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It is, of course, possible for scholars to separate strands of legitimacy
grounded in distributional fairness from whether the existence of a class
action or class settlement signals wrongdoing. But reputational harm
depends on the broader public’s perception, not scholars’. And such a distinction seems too subtle for the lay observer who does not undertake the
information costs necessary in “a noisy world” to independently verify most
allegations and instead relies on legal process as a proxy to signal merit.263
Reputational harm thus “comes largely from the category of the proceeding
itself.”264 Strong reciprocity leads most observers to react with general hostility to a form of proceeding lacking distributional fairness;265 such general
hostility, is largely inconsistent with finely parsing different forms of legitimacy to separate distributional fairness and merit.
Moreover, in the securities context, a few scholars have noted in passing
this connection between lack of compensation and perceived frivolousness.266 The legislative history of the PSLRA also connects these concepts
explicitly.267 And there is no reason to think that lack of compensation
undermines reputational harm to settling defendants only in securities cases.
As with shareholder suits,268 so too has the public questioned the efficacy of
class actions generally based on lack of compensation.269 Indeed, the concern may be even starker in class actions than in derivative suits, considering
Congress’s and the Judicial Conference’s concerns about lack of compensation and procedural legitimacy.270
If class actions are seen as legitimate means of seeking redress for victims, pursuing that legitimate objective makes proceedings look better than
263 Buell, supra note 20, at 511.
264 Buell, supra note 90, at 90; see also Coffee, supra note 10, at 425 (“Little doubt exists
that corporations dislike adverse publicity and that unfavorable publicity emanating from
an administrative or judicial source has considerable credibility.”).
265 See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 253, at 153.
266 Cox, supra note 246, at 13; Erickson, supra note 259, at 129; Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61 (1991); see also
Cox, supra note 246, at 6 (“[T]he charges [against a manager] are weakened if the
medium through which they are asserted itself lacks a credible reputation.”); James J. Park,
Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 353 (2009) (“A large shareholder-compensation payment may signal that a securities-fraud action had merit.”).
267 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 731.
268 These contexts overlap because “shareholder suit” here refers to derivative suits and
securities class actions. See Cox, supra note 246, at 5–6.
269 Id. at 13; Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 129–31; supra Part III.
270 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a), 119 Stat. 4 (“[T]here
have been abuses of the class action device that have . . . undermined public respect for
our judicial system [including when] counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class
members with coupons or other awards of little or no value . . . .”); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 19 (“The award of large attorney fees in the absence of meaningful recoveries by class members in some class actions brings the civil justice system into
disrepute.”).
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tabloid allegations.271 Although news of class action filing or settlement is
unlikely to generate the magnitude of reputational harm that criminal process does,272 as long as it maintains some procedural legitimacy, it will continue to impose reputational harm that firms’ employees can anticipate.273
Even though most cases are resolved by settlement, class settlements require
judicial approval for fairness,274 and judicial imprimatur enhances procedural legitimacy.275 Indeed, judicial approval often features in news stories
about class settlement.276 And it seems unlikely that casual observers would
distinguish between a judge finding liability and a judge approving a deal as
fair in which a corporation pays money to its victims and agrees not to fight
allegations against it.277 If defendants were not concerned that news of settlement signaled merit to at least some extent, none would bargain for agreements preventing class counsel from publicizing the settlement. But
sometimes they do.278 And even if these defendants’ concern that the public
would perceive a class settlement to indicate wrongdoing was misguided, that
at least some defendants were concerned is what that matters for deterrence.
This discussion generates several questions that cannot be resolved in
the abstract and require empirical study. One is the magnitude of the effect
of slighting compensation on reputational deterrence. Another is whether
there is some lower bound on how much compensation must go to victims to
avoid undermining reputational deterrence.
271 Hawkins, supra note 20, at 602. This is not to suggest that all class actions must
pursue damages or be perceived as frivolous. To the contrary, the public probably does
not perceive civil rights cases as frivolous just because they do not seek damages. Instead,
the claim here focuses on damages suits such as consumer or securities cases.
272 See Buell, supra note 20, at 507; Coffee, supra note 10, at 424–25.
273 See Gande & Lewis, supra note 126, at 829–30 (finding significant reputational harm
attributable to class action filing); Hersch, supra note 126, at 150 (same).
274 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring judicial finding that settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to bind absent class members).
275 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 425; see also Burch, supra note 49, at 109–10 (arguing
that judicial approval of class action settlement published in written opinion after public
fairness hearings in public courthouses open to television and newspapers is transparent
and that this transparency is important to the legal system).
276 See, e.g., Judge Approves $3.4 Billion in Indian Royalties Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (June 20,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/us/politics/21indian.html?_r=0.
277 See Hensler, supra note 151, at 451 (arguing that agreeing to pay money can demonstrate acceptance of responsibility); Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 151, at 359 (explaining that agreeing to pay compensation is seen as acknowledging some degree of
wrongdoing or responsibility for harm); Quinn, supra note 151, at 179 (arguing that corporations are aware that the public views settlement as tantamount to admission of guilt).
And indeed, likelihood of success on the merits factors into the fairness analysis. See 7B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1797.1 (3d ed.
2005).
278 See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement ¶ 115, Pappas v. Naked Juice Co. of Glendora, No.
2:11-cv-08276-JAK-PLA (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2013), ECF No. 118 (containing such a provision);
Settlement Agreement and General Release ¶ 37, Pearson v. Target Corp., No. 1:11-cv07972 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2013), ECF No. 73-1 (same).
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Lastly, whether it is better for class actions’ procedural legitimacy for
victims to typically receive a very small check than no check at all warrants
further study. Small checks may be seen as sham compensation or even
taken as insulting. But my instinct is that seeing victims get some compensation is better for legitimacy than no compensation. Those who get paid typically had to overcome transaction costs and affirmatively file a claim, which
means that they did not perceive the expected amount of the check as trivial.
And it seems unlikely that many—other than law-and-economics class action
scholars concerned about undermining enforcement incentives—would view
class actions in a worse light if they distributed ten-dollar checks than if they
did not compensate victims at all.
Reducing or even eliminating compensation would not, however, eliminate reputational harm because reputational harm also depends on the specifics of particular cases.279 The more heinous the allegations the more
likely employees and the public will be to condemn a company for refusing
to dispute them even though the condemnation will be discounted if made
through a device largely perceived as extortionist.280
Moreover, whether victims are compensated in particular cases matters
because payments to class members suggest that the defendant has wronged
identifiable individuals. Notwithstanding declines in the procedural legitimacy of class actions, defendants would have a harder time denying wrongdoing when paying people who seem like victims. This result too follows from
compensationalist sentiment. Because the public expects civil litigation to
compensate victims and sees damages as setting right the balance between
victim and wrongdoer,281 if companies pay people who are not lawyers to
make suits go away, the likely perception is that the payment affords redress
to the defendant’s victims.282
A good public-relations campaign can use victim compensation to combat some of the reputational harm, however. A defendant may conclude that
the public will attribute wrongdoing to it for its actions underlying a class suit
(because class actions are procedurally legitimate, because the defendant
appears to concede wrongdoing by compensating victims, because the mere
existence of an allegation is good enough for some, or because there is independent reason to so conclude such as television footage day-after-day showing oil pouring into the Gulf). If the defendant has already reached that
conclusion, compensating victims may help moderate the reputational harm
279 Cox, supra note 246, at 6.
280 See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 151, at 359 (explaining that agreeing to pay
compensation is seen as acknowledging some degree of wrongdoing or responsibility for
harm because “[w]e normally think that innocence from wrongdoing is a defense in
court”).
281 See Baron & Ritov, supra note 245, at 31.
282 See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 151, at 359 (“By stepping in and offering compensation, the government invited some seeking accountability for the events of September 11th to think that the government was acknowledging that it did not exercise enough
care in preventing the tragedy.”).
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because the defendant can publicly claim to have “do[ne] the right thing.”283
Thus, even though compensating victims in class actions generally and in
particular cases tends to increase reputational harm, compensation can also
be used to moderate some of that harm through a public relations campaign.284 Nonetheless, this reputational “benefit” from doing the right thing
starts from a point at which reputational harm already exists. Despite the
public-relations campaign, I seriously doubt that most people view BP as a
good global citizen. Defendants thus seem unlikely to be able to reverse that
reputational harm completely without a significant expenditure—if at all.
Accordingly, whether victims are compensated through class actions
generally affects the legitimacy of the class device, which in turn affects the
extent of class action reputational deterrence.285 If the class action settlement were seen more as an extortion mechanism or a business opportunity
for lawyers and less as a mechanism to redress harm done to victims, the
public would be less inclined to assign culpability to settlement. Instead,
class settlements would seem more like a mere cost of doing business in
America.286 Moreover, compensating class members in particular cases
appears to concede some degree of wrongdoing.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

Recognizing that compensation and reputational deterrence are intertwined means that optimizing deterrence is even more challenging than has
been previously recognized and calls into question attempts to optimize
deterrence trans-substantively across class action law.287 Broadening public
enforcement through gatekeeping procedures or allowing judges to try to get
deterrence right in individual cases are more promising.
Moreover, diminishing the reputational harm that comes from class
action filing and settlement, such as by reducing compensation, will make
defendants somewhat more likely to settle quickly than they already are; that
change in turn will impede the public informational function of litigation.288
A.

Optimizing Deterrence

That compensation affects deterrence differently from other forms of
class action relief makes social policymakers’ task of optimizing deterrence
through private class litigation even more difficult than scholars have previ283 Dodge, supra note 19, at 1272, 1280. Dodge points specifically to BP’s reliance on
its compensation fund “as the centerpiece” of its “public relations campaign.” Id. at 1313.
284 See id. at 1272, 1280.
285 The degree to which compensation affects deterrence, and at what cost, is ultimately an empirical question that this Article does not attempt to answer. Rather, its aim is
to lay the conceptual foundation for that empirical work.
286 See Cox, supra note 246, at 16 (“[P]rocedural rules existing prior to the [PSLRA]
were seen as confirming the belief that being a defendant in a securities class action was
nothing more than legalized bad luck.”).
287 See infra Section V.A.
288 See infra Section V.B.
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ously recognized. Optimal deterrence requires more than simply setting an
aggregate damage award that matches the harm imposed on others.
Scholars have widely recognized that private enforcers’ incentives and
the public’s interest in litigation are not inherently aligned.289 These divergent incentives tend to lead to a socially inefficient volume of litigation.290
Plaintiffs’ private costs of litigation are lower than its social costs;291 plaintiffs’
private benefits are also lower than litigation’s social benefits, including
deterrence.292 That there are both positive and negative externalities to
plaintiffs’ counsel’s decision to litigate, however, makes it difficult to know
whether our system will tend toward too much litigation, too little litigation,
or both.293
When the government is not serving as enforcer, policymakers cannot
directly set the enforcement level. Rather, policymakers can seek to achieve
optimal deterrence in class actions only by structuring litigation incentives.294 This is, of course, a difficult task even without considering reputational harm and compensation’s role in it.295
One important tool is awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
The traditional story with attorneys’ fee awards in class actions is a tradeoff
between deterrence and compensation.296 Higher anticipated fees as a portion of the class’s recovery mean greater likelihood of suit and thus more
deterrence but at the cost of paying that money to victims, or so the story
goes.297 Recognizing that compensation affects deterrence through reputational harm changes this calculus, however.
Because of the interrelationship of compensation and deterrence, seemingly obvious ways to alter deterrence would not in fact yield predictable
results. Even if it were clear that the status quo generated too little deterrence, it would nonetheless remain unclear what effect increasing attorneys’
fees across all class actions would have on deterrence.
289 Shavell, supra note 37, at 577; see also generally, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Social Versus
the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982) [hereinafter Shavell, Social Versus Private Incentive]; Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 81.
290 SHAVELL, supra note 81, at 265; Shavell, supra note 37, at 577.
291 Shavell, Social Versus Private Incentive, supra note 289, at 333.
292 Id. at 333–34.
293 Shavell lists factors that tend to result in too much litigation and notes that the
opposite will result in too little. Id. at 336.
294 See POSNER, supra note 53, at 842–43 (explaining that legislatures can alter the
amount of the fine to change the incentives for private enforcement but that the
probability of apprehension and conviction increases with the level of the fine, which
makes setting the optimal level of enforcement difficult). Policymakers are also hampered
by the quality of their information. See Shavell, Social Versus Private Incentive, supra note
289, at 333–34.
295 POSNER, supra note 53, at 842.
296 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2066–67; Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 1893.
297 See Macey & Miller, supra note 72, at 197 (“The request for an award of fees and
expenses places class counsel in a direct conflict with the interests of the class.”).
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To explain that, let us return to Fitzpatrick’s proposal to award all of the
recovery to class counsel when individual claim values are small.298 The
seemingly obvious conclusion that deterrence would increase with a 100%
attorneys’ fee is not in fact obvious once we account for compensation’s role.
Increasing fees as a portion of the class’s recovery means reducing compensation.299 Reducing compensation, in turn, likely reduces but does not eliminate reputational deterrence. Increasing attorneys’ fees would thus have two
opposing effects. The greater fee would encourage more enforcement and
thus create greater damages deterrence. But the reduction in compensation
would also tend to reduce reputational deterrence. Whether these effects on
deterrence would offset or whether increased fees would create more or less
deterrence is unclear, which renders policymakers’ task a taller order than
previously recognized. Accordingly, increasing attorneys’ fees to provide
greater incentive for class counsel to file suits without accounting for reputational harm risks overdeterrence and underdeterrence.300
Two scholars have recently argued that allowing defendants to “buy their
way out of court proceedings and public relations disasters ex post” through
private corporate settlement mills could lead to too little deterrence.301
Their argument suggests that defendants paying more to resolve cases with
less reputational harm would result in less net deterrence.
Importantly for this analysis, eliminating compensation would not eliminate reputational deterrence. Some class actions would continue to generate
reputational harm even in the absence of compensation because they would
nonetheless tend to increase attention on the allegations, and some employees and members of the public would continue to perceive class actions to
describe actual wrongdoing despite their diminished procedural legitimacy.302 If eliminating compensation eliminated the difficult-to-measure
reputational deterrence then it would actually make optimizing deterrence
easier, but that result is quite unlikely.303
298 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2069–70.
299 See Macey & Miller, supra note 72, at 197. Class action attorneys’ fees may be
awarded out of a common fund in which the defendants’ payment is calculated and class
counsel is paid some portion of that fund, or statutory fees may be calculated on top of the
damages paid to the class. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—
And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2139–40 (2004). But even under the statutory
fees approach, greater fees likely means less compensation for class members. See William
D. Henderson, Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form of Collusion in Class Action Settlements,
77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 815 (2003) (“Both courts and commentators have expressed apprehension that a plaintiff’s counsel may be accepting a lower settlement for the class in
exchange for a generous and nonadversarial treatment of fees.”).
300 See Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 406 & n.5 (recognizing that deterrence generated by reputational harms is a social good but not if it results in overdeterrence).
301 Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. REV.
129, 157 (2015).
302 In this scenario, the defendant’s behavior rather than the litigation itself may be the
source of most of the reputational harm, but litigation adds visibility.
303 Buell, supra note 20, at 512 (regarding measurement difficulty).
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Because even eliminating compensation would not eliminate reputational deterrence, substantially increasing attorneys’ fees carries great risk of
overdeterrence. Higher fees will mean some weaker cases are filed that
would not be filed currently.304 Importantly, however, the mere filing of a
class action reported in the media may cause reputational harm no matter
how weak the claim and even if dismissed.305 The mere allegation causes
harm, and the seeming repudiation of that allegation through dismissal will
likely mitigate but not eliminate that harm.306 A news story about allegations
of wrongdoing is more eye-catching than one about dismissal of a lawsuit.307
Thus, affording too much of an incentive to litigate can overdeter.
Fitzpatrick’s proposal in particular may overdeter. If his assumption is
right that substantive law accurately sets damages to achieve optimal deterrence solely through damages and under full enforcement, then a 100%
attorneys’ fee would get close to optimal damages deterrence; adding the
reputational component would likely go soaring past the target.308
Attorneys’ fees are not the only tools to modify litigation incentives, but
similar concerns apply to other systemic tools. Treble or punitive damages309
304 Linda Sandstrom Simard, Fees, Incentives, and Deterrence, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUM10, 14–15 (2011).
305 See R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A TrustGenerating Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1113, 1132 (2003) (arguing that mere allegations can be enough to compromise public
trust in a corporation); Selmi, supra note 126, at 1297 (“Denny’s remains plagued by suits
alleging diseriminatory [sic] service, including a high-profile lawsuit filed by Syracuse University students that, although ultimately dismissed, generated a new round of adverse
publicity.”).
306 See Ide & Yarn, supra note 305, at 1140 (“By the time the truth emerges, the harm
has been done, and while wrongdoing might get front-page headlines, corrections and
retractions rarely do.”); Gail Ramsey & Kristen McGuire, Litigation Publicity: Courtroom
Drama or Headline News?, 22 COMM. & L. 69, 84 (2000) (“[R]arely are the details of the story
[about a dismissal] complete enough to satisfy the organization or repair the damage of
negative publicity.”).
307 See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 116, at 227 (explaining that even though many
companies introduced reforms in the wake of an adverse publicity crisis, in their case studies, “not one of these reformers attracted favorable notice for its good deeds which in any
way approached the intensity of the original poor publicity”); Selmi, supra note 126, at
1257 (explaining that his sample included several cases that had only one instance of press
coverage, and that instance was typically the filing of a complaint).
308 Marcus, supra note 202, at 162; see also Allen, supra note 56, at 70 (recognizing that
“procedural devices[ ] and legal system practices” factor into optimal deterrence). Less
than perfect likelihood of detection coupled with the cases that class counsel would not
prosecute even for a 100% fee because of their opportunity cost means that damages alone
would slightly underdeter with Fitzpatrick’s proposal. Cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note
61, at 54 n.29, 70 (recognizing that some degree of underdeterrence is optimal to account
for enforcement costs). Reputational harm would seem to more than make up for that
slight underdeterrence, but that is not knowable with certainty absent further study.
309 SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS
IN THE U.S. 66 (2010) (finding damage multipliers or punitive damages in 104 federal
statutes); see also Lemos, supra note 50, at 791–92.
BRA
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and statutory damages310 are also intended to increase enforcement. Let us
assume the status quo on attorneys’ fees: class counsel receives on average
approximately twenty-five percent of the class’s recovery.311 If the available
recovery was increased via treble or punitive damages but the percentage of
that recovery paid to claimants remained the same, further study would be
necessary to discern whether that shift would affect reputational harm.
Increasing compensation in raw dollars might increase reputational deterrence and magnify the intended effect of increasing the incentive to litigate,
risking overdeterrence.312
1.

Public Enforcement

Accounting for reputational deterrence calls into question the feasibility
of purely private enforcement in class action law. Public enforcement—
although it faces significant resource constraints313 and may raise agency
capture concerns314—affords the possibility of discretionary nonenforcement in targeted cases to prevent overdeterrence, including overdeterrence
caused by reputational deterrence.315 Public enforcement allows regulatory
intervention with a scalpel rather than the hatchet of attorneys’ fees or damages enhancements applied across the board.
Recognizing governmental resource constraints,316 discretionary nonenforcement could be achieved through agency gatekeeping on private
enforcement much like the qui tam suit or the EEOC-charge requirement in
310 Lemos, supra note 50, at 791–92.
311 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 259 (2010); Fitzpatrick, supra note
163, at 814.
312 See Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 15 (describing “overenforcement theorem”);
cf. Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 81, at 1752 (“The unsure relationship between extralegal sanctions and legal penalties complicates any setoff system [that reduces damages to
account for reputational harm] to the point of infeasibility.”).
313 See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 720 (1941) (regarding limited resources).
314 See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 107 (2002). But see Steven P. Croley, Public
Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 7–9 (2000) (finding little consistent support
for capture theories); Engstrom, supra note 39, at 674 (“[W]hether agencies can be ‘captured’ at all is a contestable issue, both theoretically and empirically.” (citations omitted)).
315 Engstrom, supra note 39, at 630 (“Public enforcers can exercise prosecutorial discretion, enforcing only where the social cost of doing so (e.g., transaction costs, including
costs imposed on affected communities and judicial resources) is less than the social benefit (e.g., the value of deterred misconduct).”); Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 38
(explaining that rules of law are nearly always overinclusive and that discretionary nonenforcement can counteract that overinclusivity); Rose, supra note 51, at 1329 (explaining
that public enforcers can respond to overdeterrence through discretionary nonenforcement, but that altering incentives for private enforcement to accomplish the same objective is difficult).
316 See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 313, at 720.
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employment discrimination cases.317 A government gatekeeping role may
increase reputational deterrence in each case by adding the government’s
imprimatur to private litigation; a settled dispute would look somewhat more
like an administrative enforcement proceeding with government imprimatur
to legitimate the allegations.318 Such an increase of reputational deterrence
in each case would decrease the level of enforcement necessary to achieve
optimal deterrence and would allow greater enforcement precision. Achieving a similar level of expected sanction through fewer cases would improve
efficiency because it would reduce the level of public expenditure necessary
for the court system to resolve those class actions.319 Whether the added
administrative costs of gatekeeping would be lower than the savings from
resolving fewer cases judicially is not clear, but that seems plausible because
the presence of gatekeepers would discourage frivolous filings.
Indeed, in the area of class action law where we might most expect litigation to harm defendants’ reputations—employment discrimination—it
should come as no surprise that a gatekeeping scheme already exists.320 This
Article does not suggest that the EEOC charge requirement works well in
practice given incredibly limited resources and the volume of cases,321 but
the preference for private informal conciliation over public litigation that it
embodies can be seen as a means to reduce reputational harm.322 And that
regime also allows for the possibility that if a charge alleges significant social
harm, the government can put its imprimatur on the case and ensure that it
is prosecuted just as it can in the qui tam context.
2.

Judges Setting Damages

Another possibility for seeking to optimize damages while accounting
for reputational deterrence is for judges to set damages in individual cases to
account for reputational harm. Ideal net damages to achieve optimal deterrence should be set by deducting the benefit that the reputational harm cre317 See Rose, supra note 51, at 1305–07, 1354–64 (proposing a gatekeeper role for the
SEC in private securities class actions); see also generally Engstrom, supra note 39 (analyzing
various gatekeeping structures as ways for government to calibrate private enforcement
efforts).
318 See Karpoff et al., supra note 85, at 582 (finding significant reputational harm from
SEC enforcement actions).
319 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 61, at 53 (“[B]ecause any particular level of deterrence can be achieved with different combinations of the fine and the probability of detection, society should employ the highest possible fine and a correspondingly low probability
of detection in order to economize on enforcement expenditures.”); Shavell, Social Versus
Private Incentive, supra note 289, at 333 (explaining that plaintiffs’ private costs of litigation
are lower than the social costs).
320 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012).
321 See Engstrom, supra note 39, at 695–99 (criticizing effectiveness of EEOC charge
process).
322 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180–81 (1989) (explaining that the purpose of the EEOC charge requirement is to allow discrimination allegations to be resolved through conciliation rather than public litigation).
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ates for third parties from the amount of harm the defendant’s conduct
caused.323 Because damages class actions are nearly always resolved by settlement, as a technical matter, this would require judges to reject settlements
that did not set damages ideally with an indication of the damages that would
warrant approval.324 Even leaving aside compensation’s role in reputational
deterrence, estimating the benefit from the defendant’s reputational harm in
a particular case before awarding damages is difficult.325 Using reputational
harm as a proxy for benefit simplifies this inquiry slightly but leaves a great
deal of guesswork.326
Accounting for compensation’s role in reputational deterrence complicates the task further. Considering changes to class action compensation
over time and the degree to which they reduce reputational harm will be
more difficult still. Empirical work modeling the relationship between compensation and reputational deterrence would help but may not yield a model
with strong predictive power.
Even leaving aside the notion of getting damages exactly right, to protect reputational harm in class actions, courts should be skeptical of settlements that do not directly compensate victims such as those limited to cy pres
awards and attorneys’ fees. The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation suggests approving such settlements only when individual distributions (or additional individual distributions) are not economically viable.327
That approach is sensible and would preserve class action deterrence when
compensation is impractical but would also protect reputational deterrence
by preserving a role for compensation wherever feasible.328
323 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 408–09, 415; supra Section II.B. There are of
course noneconomic reasons why reducing plaintiffs’ damages to prevent overdeterrence
seems perverse.
324 This approach outlines a strong judicial role not only rejecting unfair settlements
but also guiding the parties to the right settlement value. But that strong judicial role is
not inconsistent with the existing practice in which judges typically take a more active and
more inquisitorial role in complex litigation. See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation
and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 1985 (1999).
325 Buell, supra note 20, at 512.
326 Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 415–17.
327 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (2010); see also id.
Reporters’ Notes (“Case law has taken various approaches in terms of the types of cy pres
remedies, if any, that are permissible. In some jurisdictions, a rule change may be necessary to establish the precise circumstances in which cy pres awards may be allowed.”). Compare Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing settlement
approval and explaining that “[a] cy pres award is supposed to be limited to money that
can’t feasibly be awarded to the . . . class members.”), with Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d
811, 817–18, 820 (9th Cir. 2012) (awarding all proceeds to charity and attorneys with a
$9.5 million settlement fund and a class of 3.6 million people), and Fraley v. Facebook,
Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (distributing relief to claimants from
$20 million settlement fund and class of 150 million people but also distributing additional
money to charity and attorneys).
328 The advisory committee proposed incorporating this standard into Rule 23, but it
later balked away from that proposal.
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It is difficult to know how well government gatekeepers or judges could
estimate reputational costs in trying to optimize deterrence through a
gatekeeping role or setting ideal net damages. Accounting for compensation’s role in reputational deterrence makes those challenges greater still.
Both approaches are preferable to sweeping changes to attorneys’ fees across
all class action law, but whether they are worth the candle or whether optimizing deterrence is simply too fraught with error costs is not knowable in
the abstract.
B.

Normative Role of Reputational Harm

Leaving aside questions of optimizing deterrence, there are reasons that
eliminating reputational harm may be a bad idea. Reputational harm may be
more efficient than damages sanctions in class actions. One reason is that
certified damages class actions that are not dismissed on procedural grounds
are nearly always resolved via settlement and frequently without significant
discovery;329 judgments reached via settlement may not be nearly as effective
at achieving optimal deterrence as those reached after trial because trial
helps complete the informational picture.330
Reputational harm may also be more socially efficient than damages
sanctions because it tends to better reflect social harms that the defendant
has inflicted on non-plaintiffs. In employment discrimination cases, for
instance, a practice of discrimination331 harms more than just the members
of the protected class who were employed by the defendant.332 Rather, such
practices harm all members of the protected class and social equality more
broadly.333 A damages sanction would, at best,334 force internalization of
only the class’s harm, but a reputational sanction will instead tend to match
the social harm of the challenged behaviors by its very nature.
329 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 163, at 812 (“[V]irtually all cases certified as class actions
and not dismissed before trial end in settlement.”); Issacharoff, supra note 89, at 3173
(describing settlement as “the overwhelming form of resolution of any case in which a class
is certified”).
330 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 61, at 65.
331 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (requiring a “common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke”).
332 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 837–70 (2003) (arguing that employment discrimination law is justified because it prohibits employers from contributing to entrenched
social inequalities); Richard A. Epstein & Erwin Chemerinsky, Should Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 Be Repealed?, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 349, 358 (1993) (Chemerinsky:
describing “the terrible social harms of employment discrimination”).
333 Epstein & Chemerinsky, supra note 332, at 358.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 329–30.
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Moreover, reducing reputational harm undercuts the extent to which
class actions can serve a public informational function.335 As discussed
above, reputational harm in class actions can come in various forms, including harm from settling a class action or harm from facts or evidence that
emerge through investigation of the claims, discovery, or at trial.336 And
defendants have some flexibility as to which of these forms of reputational
harm to incur. If defendants are particularly concerned about revealing otherwise nonpublic information or creating bad evidence through discovery or
public trial, they can raise their settlement offer to the level necessary to settle before discovery becomes risky.337 It seems that the NFL did just that in
the concussion lawsuit brought by its former players.338 If compensation
were slighted in class actions (or reputational harm from class settlements
were reduced for any reason), the filing and settlement harms would become
cheaper relative to discovery or trial harms than they are now.339 The reason
is that reducing compensation would not affect discovery or trial reputational
harms; those harms depend on the evidence that the case creates rather than
on the procedure as a proxy. Settlement would become somewhat cheaper
than before, however. The relative change in defendants’ costs would
encourage more quick settlements, which would mean that fewer class
actions survive long enough to reveal or generate information about widespread harms.
Defendants’ temptation to settle quickly is further heightened because
of reasonable concern that a single document may be taken out of context in
the media to be far more damning than it actually is.340 Evidence in the WalMart record about adult dance clubs shows only that three managers once
mentioned going to an adult dance club and that it was far from regular
335 This informational function is largely nonexistent in piggyback class actions. In
such cases, class counsel relies on the existence of a government investigation and its subsequent findings for settlement leverage.
336 See supra text accompanying notes 163–71.
337 See S. Todd Brown, Plaintiff Control and Domination in Multidistrict Mass Torts, 61
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 421 (2013) (explaining that defendants may pay a premium to settle
class actions quickly); Shavell, supra note 37, at 605 (“[W]hen parties settle, various facts
that would have emerged at trial do not come to the notice of the broader public. . . . For
example, a defendant firm whose product was defective may not want this information to
come to public light and may be willing to pay an extra amount for that reason to achieve
settlement. . . .”); see also Cooter & Porat, supra note 18, at 416 n.17 (“[A]voiding nonlegal
sanctions motivates the settlement of suits.”).
338 See Charles P. Pierce, The Crisis, GRANTLAND (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.grantland.
com/story/_/id/9632293/the-nfl-concussion-settlement (“That $765 million was to buy
silence. It was to abort an embarrassing discovery process. It was to bury the evidence of
how little the NFL ever has cared about the health of the people who work for it.”).
339 Nothing in this Section is meant to suggest that discovery actually occurs in most
class actions but rather that the number of class actions that proceed to discovery could be
lower still if filing and settlement reputational harms were reduced.
340 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM 90 (2013),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/The_New_Lawsuit_Ecosystem_
pages_web.pdf.
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practice.341 Plaintiffs’ treatment of that evidence,342 however, led to news
coverage that Wal-Mart required women to attend meetings at strip clubs.343
Quick settlement would, at first glance, appear to enhance efficiency.
Both sides would spend less money on litigation, lowering the deadweight
loss of litigation expenses and the transaction costs of resolving the dispute.344 And as a private matter between the defendant and class counsel,
that would be right.
But civil litigation serves an important societal function insofar as it can
reveal or generate information about wrongdoing and wrongdoers that
informs the broader public.345 This positive informational externality complicates the efficiency calculus about quick settlement.346 And indeed, class
members may, at least in some instances, value obtaining the sort of information that only litigation can unearth.347 One scholar explains, “Litigation is
when the facts come out. . . . Litigation over the safety of a drug or product
reveals all of the research on that drug or product—whether published or
341 E.g., Decl. of Christine Webber, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-cv-2252 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 28, 2003) Ex. 42 at 321, Ex. 40 at 196; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8–9,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
342 Brief for Respondents at 19, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10277) (“Numerous Wal-Mart managers admitted that they regularly go to strip clubs when
they attend company management meetings.”).
343 Female Wal-Mart Workers: Meetings Held at Strip Clubs, supra note 170.
344 See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 694 (referring to litigation costs as “a
deadweight loss that only benefits attorneys”); James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the
Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 69 (1997) (“Litigating parties incur
deadweight losses that they could avoid if they settled their case.”).
345 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 37, at 605 (explaining that litigation can bring damaging facts to light and that “if the public learns about the defect, perhaps people can take
precautions to reduce harm”); see also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2648–52 (1995) (describing concerns about informational loss
from secret settlements); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 61, at 65 (“[S]ettlements also
sometimes allow defendants to keep aspects of their behavior secret . . . .”); Schwartz, supra
note 44, at 1057 (explaining in the context of informational benefits to defendants that
“lawsuits can unearth information about misconduct that organizations have hidden from
regulators and the public at large”).
346 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and
Trials, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 109, 109 (1988) (“[O]nce deterrence is taken into account,
trials may be superior despite their higher transaction costs.”). Offset against this positive
externality are judicial expenditures that the parties have no reason to take into account.
347 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences
with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 645, 647–48 (2008) (describing
nonmonetary values that may have caused claimants to wait before bringing claims on the
9/11 Victim Compensation Fund including obtaining “information from otherwise inaccessible sources (the decision makers who determined airline and World Trade Center fire
safety procedures, for example)”); see also id. at 661 (recounting survey response of some
who filed lawsuits instead of filing claims in the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund because
“[they] wanted a trial to find out more about what happened and whether people had
failed to do their job to keep us safe”).
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‘proprietary.’ Litigation over an asset-securitization transaction may bring to
light how parties constructed the transaction.”348 Judicial filings are presumptively public and thus typically serve this informational function.349 Private mass–dispute resolution systems need not be public, however, and their
lack of transparency about widespread injuries has caused some scholars
pause.350 Reducing reputational harm would raise some of the same
concern.
Publicly revealing information allows consumers to make more
informed choices as to their primary behavior and avoid future harm.351
Product safety litigation presents the clearest case. Informed consumers can
opt not to buy risky products.352 Consider the pharmaceutical context: litigation brought to light dangers of Vioxx and Neurontin of which consumers
had been largely unaware.353 The problems with General Motors’ ignition
switches that led to massive recalls also first emerged through litigation investigation.354 Big tobacco’s reputation was severely damaged by the release of
internal documents procured through discovery.355
348 LoPucki, supra note 43, at 510.
349 See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979) (noting that
“[f]or many centuries, both civil and criminal trials have traditionally been open to the
public” and explaining that “in some civil cases the public interest in access, and the salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most criminal cases”).
350 Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 157; Thornburg, supra note 186, at 210
(“When disputes are litigated in a court, the public generally has access to this information. Privatized processes, in contrast, . . . may result in the public, or even the government, lacking information about important issues of public health or safety or product
reliability.”).
351 Cooter and Porat identify informing the public to enable others to avoid injury as
one of the value-creating aspects of reputational harm to defendants. See Cooter & Porat,
supra note 18, at 405.
352 See Thornburg, supra note 186, at 210 (“Privatized processes, in contrast, . . . may
result in the public, or even the government, lacking information about important issues
of public health or safety or product reliability.”). If the product is not too dangerous,
consumers can continue to buy it but might be willing to pay less.
353 See Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/business/21merck.html?_r=0 (describing
evidence introduced at trial against Merck, in which Merck’s top scientists expressed concern about increased risks of cardiovascular events and later confirmed the risks through
clinical trial); Heidi Li Feldman, Pushing Drugs: Genomics and Genetics, the Pharmaceutical
Industry, and the Law of Negligence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 575, 587–88 (2003) (explaining that
litigation discovery demonstrated that the “new product committee” for Neurontin
decided to expand sales of drugs by running small studies and placing results in medical
journal articles it hired advertising agencies to write as a means of promoting off-label use);
Melody Petersen, Memos Cast Shadow on Drug’s Promotion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2002), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2002/12/20/business/memos-cast-shadow-on-drug-s-promotion.html
(same).
354 Vlasic, supra note 44.
355 See Robert L. Rabin, Reflections on Tort and the Administrative State, 61 DEPAUL L. REV.
239, 257 (2012) (explaining that “release of internal documents severely damage[ed] the
reputation of the industry”); Roberta B. Walburn, The Role of the Once-Confidential Industry
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For examples of class actions serving this public informational function,
consider two examples discussed earlier. Merrill Lynch’s CEO acknowledged
in a deposition that black brokers might have had a harder time at the company because the prospective client base was mostly white.356 A Wal-Mart
employee filed a declaration stating that she attended a business meeting at a
Hooters restaurant.357 To the extent that these facts make employees, potential customers, or investors uncomfortable, they can vote with their feet.
CONCLUSION
There is reason to think that the extent of victim compensation in damages class actions affects the amount of deterrence that class actions generate
and not simply as one of many equal ways to force defendants to incur costs.
Rather, compensation affects reputational deterrence in ways that other
forms of relief do not because the American public expects and values compensation in civil litigation, including in class actions. Thus, class actions are
more procedurally legitimate when they comport with those expectations
and are more likely to be seen to signal wrongdoing because of that greater
procedural legitimacy.
Scholars have rightly recognized that a firm anticipating a $10 million
damages award incurs $10 million worth of damages deterrence no matter
whether it expects to pay class counsel, the class members, or charity through
a cy pres award. But firms are not deterred only $10 million if their expected
damages from a lawsuit are $10 million. When a defendant settles a class
action, its reputation may be harmed internally with its employees and externally with customers and business associates. Anticipating that reputational
harm provides additional deterrence.
The magnitude of reputational deterrence depends in part on whether
victims are typically compensated in class actions. If class actions as a whole
typically fail to provide the compensation the public expects, the social legitimacy of the class device will decrease and the culpability that the public
attaches to settling a class action or being named as a class action defendant
will decrease with it.
That compensation affects deterrence through reputational harm has
several important implications. Perhaps most importantly, achieving optimal
deterrence in class litigation broadly is even more complicated than has been
previously recognized. Seemingly straightforward approaches such as eliminating compensation to focus only on deterrence do not actually allow social
policymakers to effectively control deterrence. Indeed, it is not clear
whether increasing attorneys’ fees at the expense of compensation would
Documents, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 431, 436 (1999) (describing protracted discovery
fights that led ultimately to production by big tobacco companies of highly damaging documents including documents belying testimony that “smoking isn’t addictive”).
356 McGeehan, supra note 45.
357 Hawkes, supra note 46.
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increase or decrease overall deterrence because of the countervailing effect
on reputational deterrence that reducing compensation would cause.
Allowing the government to play a gatekeeping role in enforcement similar to the qui tam suit offers greater promise. Judges setting damages in
individual cases to optimize deterrence may also offer some hope. Nonetheless, the ability to estimate reputational harm even reasonably accurately
remains to be seen and would benefit from empirical work trying to model
expectations of reputational harm and fleshing out factors that affect the
magnitude of harm.
Lastly, this Article has argued that there is some benefit to reputational
harm from litigation. It increases deterrence more efficiently than increasing the volume of litigation does. Moreover, reducing expected reputational
harm from settlement by reducing compensation is likely to make defendants
even less willing to subject themselves to discovery in class actions than they
are now. Such a shift would thus undermine the potential for class actions to
generate a public informational externality that informs consumer choice.

